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INSTITUTIONAL DISSONANCE IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR
EVELYN BRODY*
[Nonprofit organizations] crucially important function in the
American polity [derives from] their concrete historical association
with a particular institutional culture, a configuration of values,
resources, organizational technologies, legal infrastructure, and
styles of leadership. This institutional culture originated at the
end of the eighteenth century, became dominant ... in the twenti-
eth, and entered a period of crisis-quite possibly a crisis of suc-
cess-in our own time.'
I. INTRODUCTION
S OME observers of the nonprofit sector take a dim view of fin-de-
millinium America. As support diminishes for public solutions to
social problems, nonprofits appear unable to shoulder the burden.
Activities in all sectors seem commercialized, making it harder to
distinguish nonprofit enterprises from proprietary ones. Daily, the
press reports on television ministries, cut-throat competition for
university students, the explosion in proprietary hospitals, bloated
salaries for nonprofit executives and corporate sponsorship of col-
lege athletics. Perceived abuses of nonprofit privileges bring calls
for legal reform.
To the dismay of others, however, our enlightened age still
does not permit collective activity to move freely among various
forms of enterprise-public, for-profit and nonprofit-as efficiency
and efficacy would appear to dictate. Why shouldn't primary edu-
cation be available according to the preferences of different fami-
lies, from the best public, nonprofit and even proprietary schools?
Why don't hospitals readily convert from nonprofit to for-profit
form, or vice versa, as conditions warrant? Why does the public re-
sent high salaries in the public and nonprofit sectors, when failure
to pay the going wage can result in poor service? To these observ-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. This work was
supported by the Marshall D. Ewell Research Fund at the Chicago-Kent College of
Law, and benefited greatly from comments made by my colleagues at Chicago-
Kent during a faculty roundtable. I also thank Lori Andrews, Ellen Aprill, Stuart
Deutsch, Richard Hasen, Harold Krent, Martin Malin, Jack Siegel, Joan Steinman,
Howard Schoenfeld, John Simon and Dennis R. Young.
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(433)
1
Brody: Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
ers, social institutions other than the law constrain activity, some-
times for the worse. They believe that the wrong laws only increase
the "lock in" of various activities into certain sectors.
Our political and economic system traditionally splits into
three distinct sectors: public (government), proprietary (business)
and nonprofit (charity and mutual benefit). The public currently
holds several popular beliefs and expectations: the government
provides physical infrastructure, policing and schooling; the busi-
ness sector satisfies market demands for goods and services while
returning profits to shareholders; and charities satisfy the social
needs that fall between the cracks.
An examination of historical and current events, however,
reveals that a clear tripartition of these three sectors never existed
in the United States. The basic terms of the economic and social
debate are eternal, while institutions dominant at different times
and in different localities resolved the sectoral choices in different
ways. Advocates of strong formal laws face disappointment and
frustration by trying to assign firms to the "right" sector. Indeed,
nonprofit law takes a laissez-faire approach to permissible nonprofit
activities. Rather than amend the nonprofit corporate laws, society
would do better by targeting subsidies (including tax subsidies) to
desired services, provided either in the nonprofit or for-profit
sector.
Part II of this Article sets forth the developments giving rise to
calls for legal reform.2 This extensive description of activities, both
historical and current, reveals that the apparent erosion of sectoral
purity rests on a misunderstanding of the traditional function of
nonprofit organizations, as well as a misapprehension of the eco-
nomic and social pressures they face.3 In our mixed political econ-
omy, the boundaries between the government, business and
nonprofit sectors constantly shift, blur and overlap. Nevertheless,
many people believe certain nonprofit behaviors to be "inappropri-
ate." Part III explains how such concerns need not necessarily be
addressed by formal laws, because a flexible and constantly evolving
network of other social institutions governs the behavior of non-
2. For a discussion of the historical context of calls for reform, see infra notes
10-144 and accompanying text.
3. See generally Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Conver-
gence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. ScHi. L. REv. 457
(1996) [hereinafter, Brody, Agents Without Principals] (exploring whether nonprof-
its are different from for-profits from an economic perspective).
[Vol. 41: p. 433
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profit organizations and the people who deal with them.4 Next,
Part IV explores past and current proposals to reform nonprofit
laws. 5 Part V, the analysis, largely defends the legal status quo.6
Most of the problems cited today have long been recognized. Ex-
isting reform proposals would either fail to fix these problems or
create additional difficult problems. In Part VI, I conclude that, for
the most part, these issues are better addressed by social institutions
other than the law.7
A few words on terminology will help focus the discussion to
follow. The proprietary sector is usually called "for-profit" to distin-
guish it from the "nonprofit" sector, although both proprietary and
nonprofit entities may earn a surplus from year-to-year.8 Nonprofit
entities fall loosely into one of two categories: charities (including
churches, schools, hospitals and social service organizations) and
mutual-benefit organizations (including labor unions, trade associa-
tions and social clubs). For simplicity, this Article sometimes uses
the term "charity" interchangeably with "nonprofit."
An additional legal distinction complicates the analysis. In
England, nearly every charity is a charitable trust, endowed with per-
petual life as an exception to the Rule Against Perpetuities. Ameri-
can nonprofits, however, prefer the corporate solution to human
mortality, and therefore this Article concentrates on the law of non-
profit corporations.
Finally, the public often conflates the concept of a nonprofit
organization and the concept of a tax-exempt organization. Basi-
cally, state law defines the substantive law of nonprofits, and federal
law determines whether a nonprofit may claim exemption from the
federal income tax on trusts or corporations. 9 While the public
might think that all nonprofits are tax-exempt-and indeed, while
some founders might form an activity as a nonprofit in order to
4. For a discussion of these social forces, see infra notes 145-83 and accompa-
nying text.
5. For a discussion of these proposals, see infra notes 184-276 and accompany-
ing text.
6. For a discussion of the status quo, see infra notes 277-341 and accompany-
ing text.
7. For an argument that current problems are best addressed by social institu-
tions other than the law, see infra notes 342-43 and accompanying text.
8. Economists, and some state statutes, refer to this latter group as "not-for-
profit" to remove any inference that the organization is legally constrained from
earning a surplus in any year. See, e.g., N.Y. NoT-FoR-PROFIT CORPORATION LAW
§ 103 (McKinney 1970) (defining "not-for-profit" as corporation whose purpose is
not pecuniary gain).
9. State statutes commonly grant some sort of property tax exemption for
charities.
19961
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obtain tax exemption-the states have an interest separate from tax
exemption in policing the nonprofit sector. This Article concen-
trates on the substantive law of nonprofits, leaving the issues of tax
exemption and other subsidies for future discussion.
II. THE HISTORICAL AND CURRENT CONTEXT OF CALLS
FOR REFORM
Many Americans believe that the government takes too much
of our money and wastes much of what it collects.10 They believe
that only the diversity of private enterprise, including a nonprofit
sector, can satisfy our heterogeneous needs.11 Since de Toc-
queville's famous commemoration of the American propensity to
form voluntary associations, 12 we have primarily viewed ourselves as
self-reliant in "community," somehow defined independently of
government.13 But, as my father likes to say, "Things ain't what they
10. The rigorous explanation for governmental red tape points to the govern-
ment's accountability:
It must treat equals equally and it must show that it is doing so.... I use
the term [red tape] to indicate the rigidly rule-bound requirements and
restraints that administrators are almost forced to impose, since they may
be called upon to defend their actions publicly in any specific case.
James Douglas, Political Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in THE NONPROFIT SEC-
TOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 43, 49-50 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987) [hereinafter
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR]; see also DEREGULATING THE PUBLIC SERVICE (John J. Dilu-
lio, Jr. ed., 1994) (providing scholarly analyses of "waste, fraud, and abuse"
arguments).
11. Douglas, supra note 10, at 47 ("The classic pluralist argument is that a
voluntary nonprofit sector permits a greater diversity of social provisions than the
state itself can achieve.").
12. 2 ALExIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 106 (P. Bradley ed.,
1966). According to de Tocqueville,
Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form
associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing compa-
nies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds,
religious, moral, serious, futile, general or restricted, enormous or dimin-
utive .... Wherever at the head of some new undertaking you see the
government in France, or a man of rank in England, in the United States
you will be sure to find an association.
Id. See also Mary Bosworth Treudley, The "Benevolent Fair": A Study of Charitable
Organization Among American Women in the First Third of the Nineteenth Century, 14
SOC. SERV. REV. 509 (1940), reprinted in COMPASSION AND RESPONSIBILrrY READINGS
IN THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 132 (Frank R.
Breul & Steven J. Diner eds., 1980) [hereinafter COMPASSION] ("The victorious
conclusion of the Revolutionary War released an extraordinary amount of social
energy among Americans. Along the eastern seaboard that energy was trans-
formed into associations of all sorts, especially of an educational or humanitarian
character.").
13. See, e.g., Dana Milbank, GOP Proposal Would Let Charity Begin at Home with
Taxpayers Choosing Their Favorite Causes, WALL ST.J.,June 20, 1996, at A20. Republi-
can presidential candidate Bob Dole declared that his proposal for a tax credit of
up to $500 for donations to charities that direct their services to the poor "would
436
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used to be; in fact, they never was." The classic three-sector model
never really reflected three distinct spheres of ownership or activity.
A. Public or Private?
Early in American history, the law and social institutions did
not distinguish between public and private entities, or even be-
tween nonprofit and proprietary ones.14 Once corporations (in-
cluding nonprofit ones) won legal autonomy, the private sectors
(including the nonprofit sector) performed important economic
functions within society. Evidently, the less the elites were able to
control the public sector, the more they needed a nonprofit sector
to bolster their control of the proprietary sector. Today, institu-
tional investors such as pension trusts, foundations and charitable
endowments invest trillions of dollars worth of risk capital. 15
present Americans with a stark choice .... Give your money to the.Department of
Housing and Urban Development, or give it to Habitat for Humanity ... to big
government, or to Big Brothers and Big Sisters." Id. But see Carolyn D. Wright &
Fred Stokeld, Charities Far From Sold on Dole's Proposed Charitable Tax Credit, 72 TAX
NoTEs 951, 951 (Aug. 19, 1996) (describing how Dole severely scaled back his
proposal). Senator Dole's initial plan would have cost up to $120 billion in fore-
gone taxes for the six-year budget period; the revised plan cost only $5.2 billion.
Id. It would permit taxpayers to claim a credit for only one-half the amount they
donate, but not more than $50 in 1997 and $100 in 1998, and would sunset there-
after. Id.
14. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1059, 1101-
02 (1980). According to Frug,
Corporations, whether cities or mercantile entities, were chartered only
to further public purposes, and many of their functions overlapped....
Many mercantile corporations wielded the same powers as cities, such as
eminent domain, while many cities received their income from the same
sources as mercantile corporations, primarily commerce and trade....
Many cities and mercantile corporations were controlled by an elite, and
consequently both were subject to popular attack.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 1097 ("Even colonial religious bodies often
considered themselves corporations, their corporate nature seen as affirming and
strengthening their associational ties.").
15. At the end of 1990, public and private pension funds owned assets worth
approximately $3.5 trillion. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL
AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 68 tbl.6.1 (1992).
The aggregate pension portfolio contained roughly 37% of all U.S. corporate stock
and 46% of all U.S. corporate bonds. Id. at 67. In 1989, tax-exempt organizations
(other than private foundations) reported aggregate investments in securities of
$203 billion. Celia Hilgert & Paul Arnsberger, Charities and Other Tax-Exempt Orga-
nizations, Highlights of 1 989 Data, reprinted in INTERsNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS
OF INCOME, 2 COMPENDIUM OF STUDIES OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, 1986-1992,
at 69 tbl.1 (1993) (noting that smaller tax-exempts that filed simplified Form
990EZ reported additional $501 million in "cash, savings, and investments"). In
1992, private foundations reported $144 billion in investments in securities, allo-
cated 66% to corporate stock, 21% to government bonds and 13% to corporate
debt. Paul Arnsberger & Susan Estep, Private Foundations and Charitable Trusts,
1992, in 15 SOI BULL. 152 (Winter 1995-96).
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1. Political Economies
Following the American Revolution, debates raged in the states
over the availability, and desirability, of political control over corpo-
rations. 16 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward'7 established that
the charter of a corporation, even a nonprofit corporation, cannot
be amended unilaterally by the state.18 Historian Louis Hartz
viewed the triumph of corporate independence as inevitable be-
cause economic growth needs political stability.19
A private nonprofit sector performs important economic and
political functions. A study by historian Peter Dobkin Hall found
that the elitist nineteenth-century Boston Brahmins feared the
political power of the general populace. In response, they endowed
universities, hospitals and other charities in order to build up the
learned professions (such as law, medicine, science and business)
for their sons.20 To close the loop, the professionals, through in-
16. See Louis HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT: PENN-
SYLVANIA, 1776-1860, at 250-51 (1948) (detailing debate between Locke, Paine and
Ingersoll over desirability of political control of corporations); see generally HARRY
N. SCHEMER, OHIO CANAL ERA: A CASE STUDY OF GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY,
1820-1861 (1969) (studying American state government and its role in public en-
terprise); Gregory A. Mark, Note, The Personification of the Business Corporation in
American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987) (tracing legal evolution of American
corporations).
17. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
18. Id. at 636. State corporation laws now often contain such a reservation
clause. See James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an
Agenda for Reform, 34 EMORY Lj. 617, 644 (1985) (cautioning that decision for
Dartmouth College could have come out differently had Dartmouth actually oper-
ated as public institution, "a forerunner of modern state action arguments"). Jus-
tice Story's concurrence in Dartmouth College suggests that a legislature could
amend a charter if it had reserved that right in the original grant. Dartmouth Col-
lege, 17 U.S. at 675, 708, 712.
19. HARTZ, supra note 16, at 252. Hartz observed:
The Dartmouth College ideology, with its emphasis upon previously ac-
quired property rights and its grave respect for the organic growth of law,
betrayed an ideal political world of measured change, limited shifts. On
the other hand, the democratic dogma that was mobilized against it, with
its changing popular sovereign, its rotating offices, and its worship of the
immediate mass will, reflected a version of political life as a fluid contin-
gent affair[:] "Each generation should act for itself.... Each generation
is more competent to regulate its internal policy, than a preceding
generation."
But the] developing exploitation of the corporate device was itself a sure
indication that business enterprise was moving into a new era of long-
range planning which called for an increasingly stable legal and political
environment.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting speeches of Thomas Earle).
20. Defending Harvard's property-tax exemption before the state legislature
in 1874, Harvard President Charles Eliot asked:
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terlocking trusteeships, then managed these endowments by invest-
ing in local industrial and commercial enterprises.2 1 The pattern of
bank failures during the depression of 1837-1842 dramatically illus-
trates the impact of such arrangements. Out of the twenty-four
commercial banks in Boston that survived the depression, twenty-
one enjoyed ties to endowed charitable organizations through di-
rectors and trustees, while nine of the ten banks that failed had no
such connections. 22
The Midwestern model of philanthropy saw closer ties among
the three sectors. While states created land-grant colleges and uni-
versities, Midwestern business put a populist twist on Boston's ef-
forts to link the proprietary and nonprofit sectors. For example,
Cleveland's business community conducted coordinated appeals
(called "federated campaigns") that permitted donor designation
of a charitable beneficiary.23 In 1913, Cleveland pioneered the
community foundation, which similarly allowed small donations to
be pooled and managed for local charitable purposes in
perpetuity.24 The Cleveland Foundation was essentially a quasi-
public body, with elected officials and judges dominating the
board.25
The almost unimaginable private wealth amassed through
technological revolutions after the Civil War gave rise to the grant-
Who have built up the manufactures and trade of this bleak and sterile
Massachusetts? A few men of singular sagacity, integrity, courage, backed
by hundreds of thousands of men and women of common intelligence,
courage, and honesty.... Massachusetts today owes its mental and moral
characteristics, and its wealth, to eight generations of people who have
loved and cherished Church, School, and College.
HALL, supra note 1, at 182.
21. Id. at 174. See generally, Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and the
Democratization of Dynasty (Aug. 22, 1996) [hereinafter Brody, Charitable En-
dowments] (unpublished manuscript, on file with Villanova Law Review) (explor-
ing role of charitable endowments in political economy).
22. HALL, supra note 1, at 176.
23. Id. at 163. The United Way began in Denver in 1887, and the Cleveland
Chamber of Commerce created the first Community Chest at the turn of the cen-
tury. JOHN S. GLASER, THE UNITED WAY SCANDAL 36, 37 (1994).
24. A dissenting voice wrote of the pressure of communitarianism:
"Cleveland would cooperate even if it had to be genteelly clubbed into
doing so. Cleveland would be neighborly, Cleveland would give til it
hurt.... In 1924, it may be recalled, the voters of Cleveland rejected the
stainless Calvin in favor of the hell-roaring La Follette.... Did it bespeak
a proletarian dissatisfaction with the art galleries, libraries, parks, schools,
little theaters and scientific charity? Was it a revolt against the whole the-
ory of municipal grandmothering?"
HALL, supra note 1, at 169 (quoting R.L. Duffus writing in The New Republic at end
of 1920s).
25. Id. at 164.
1996] 439
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making foundation, often family controlled and located primarily
in New York. By the 1920s, foundations begun by such families as
Rockefeller, Ford, Mellon, Field, du Pont, Carnegie and Lilly
"helped tie together the system of government bureaus, private so-
cial-service agencies, universities, trade associations, and profes-
sional societies that composed the backbone of [President]
Hoover's associationist vision." 26
Down to our own age, governments cannot resist using tax
abatements and other incentives to encourage certain activities.
Early state governments made no sectoral distinctions in bestowing
or withholding tax subsidies. New England canal, turnpike, bridge
and manufacturing companies enjoyed the same tax exemption ex-
tended to eleemosynary entities such as Yale College.2 7 In the first
wave of tax reform under President Ronald Reagan, certain sectors
of the business community enjoyed negative income tax rates
through the combination of accelerated depreciation and invest-
ment tax credits on new equipment.2 8 In the same era, the U.S.
Treasury Department bailed out the Chrysler Corporation by guar-
anteeing $1.2 billion of loans to the corporation in return for stock
warrants. Happily, the federal government turned a $184 million
profit by exercising the warrants (against the corporation's
wishes!) 29
26. Id. at 187. See generally WALDEMAR A. NIELSEN, THE BIG FOUNDATIONS
(1972) (explaining nature and role of foundations in American life).
27. HALL, supra note 1, at 21. By 1900, New Jersey ranked second in the rate
of property taxation, but near the bottom in the ratio of tax collected to total
property value; exemptions, mostly for railroad property, covered more than one-
fourth of the state. Harold W. Stoke, Economic Influences upon the Corporation Laws
of New Jersey, 38J. POL. ECON. 551, 568 (1930).
28. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE REV. PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILrIY Acr OF 1982,
H.R. REP. No. 97-4961, at 35 (1982). According to this report:
Cost recovery deductions for most personal property allowed under [the
Accelerated Cost Recovery System], in combination with the regular in-
vestment tax credit, generated tax benefits which had a present value that
was more generous than the tax benefits that would be available if the full
cost of the investment could be deducted in the year when the investment
was made.
Id.
29. See, e.g., ROBERT B. REICH & JOHN D. DONAHUE, NEW DEALS: THE
CHRYSLER REVIVAL AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM (1985) (examining complicated ma-
neuvering involved in Chrysler deal); Nathaniel C. Nash, Pro & Con: Federal
Bailouts in a Free Market, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1986, § 4, at 5 (questioning two Sena-
tors on their views of Chrysler bailout); David E. Sanger, U.S. to Sell Its Chysler
Warrants, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1983, at DI (reporting that United States will sell
Chrysler warrants at profit against wishes of Chrysler). In the late 1980s, concern
over the money-center banks' financial safety and soundness led some to speculate
that the federal government would routinely pump in revenue to banks viewed as
440 [Vol. 41: p. 433
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Government laws and regulations increasingly blur the pri-
vate/public distinction in matters such as zoning, building codes,
workplace safety, labor relations, antitrust issues, securities offer-
ings, income tax subsidies and environmental impact.30 We also
have a new form of entity, the government-sponsored enterprise,
such as Fannie Mae, whose stock is in private hands, but whose obli-
gations are backed by the federal government.31
2. Privatizing Government Social Services
a. Public Welfare Versus Private Charity
The poor have always been among us, as has the debate over
the proper role of government in alleviating their distress and in
ameliorating conditions that may lead to poverty.32 In 1854, Presi-
dent Franklin Pierce vetoed a bill, requested by Dorothea Dix, for
the federal government to finance institutions for the mentally ill.s3
The door slammed shut on a federal social welfare role and re-
mained closed until the New Deal era.3 4
During colonial times, states adopted the Elizabethan Poor
Laws, and responsibility for the poor rested with local govern-
ments. 35 " [T] he essentially 'American way' of aiding the poor was
"too big to fail." In 1991, Congress scaled back the "too big to fail doctrine" by
limiting insurance to $100,000 per depositer in all but the rarest cases, where bank
failure presents a systemic risk to the U.S. financial system. See Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 § 123(b), Pub. L. No. 102-242,
105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1823).
30. See also BARRY BOZEMAN, ALL ORGANIZATIONS ARE PUBLIC: BRIDGING PUB-
LIC AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIES 94-95 (1987) (arraying organizations
on "publicness grid," whose x-axis is political authority and whose y-axis is eco-
nomic authority).
31. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED
ENTERPRISES (May 1990) and REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON GOv-
ERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES (Apr. 1991); see also Carrie S. Lavargna, Govern-
ment-Sponsored Enterprises Are "Too Big to Fail": Balancing Public and Private Interests,
44 HAST. L.J. 991, 1011-14 (1993).
32. Cf Fishman, supra note 18, at 621-22 n.20 (citing DANIELJ. BOORSTIN, THE
AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 71-95 (1958)) (describing how State of
Georgia was first established as charitable corporation for English poor, but plan
failed and charter of corporation was returned to crown in 1752).
33. See, e.g., Seaton W. Manning, The Tragedy of the Ten-Million-Acre Bill, 36 Soc.
SERV. REv. 44 (1962), reprinted in COMPASSION, supra note 12, at 169, 172 (tracing
history of veto).
34. Id. at 175. The author notes that "the traditional patterns of exclusive
local and state responsibility for social matters continued unchanged until the
ravages of the great depression, producing bankrupt local governments and
overburdened voluntary agencies, forced significant modifications of the old tradi-
tions." Id.
35. Eleanor Parkhurst, Poor Relief in a Massachusetts Village in the Eighteenth Cen-
tury, 11 Soc. SERV. REV. 446 (1937), reprinted in COMPASSION, supra note 12, at 95.
1996]
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through legislative enactments and taxation rather than through re-
liance upon voluntary efforts, for the great growth of organized phi-
lanthropy did not take place until the nineteenth century."3 6 We
continue today to see strong echoes of the Puritan view of charity:
the notion that attributes poverty to the sufferer's sins of intemper-
ance, indolence and extravagance.3 7 Thus, Americans sought to
limit relief, granting it only to the "worthy" or "deserving" poor,
such as widows and orphans, whose misfortune could not have been
foreseen.38 Pre-Civil War debates raged over the supposed deleteri-
ous effects of the poor laws, which, by "'removing the dread of want
... destroyed the main incitement to industry."' 3 9 This view advo-
cated reliance on voluntary philanthropy, which, born out of reli-
gious spirit, improved both benefactor and recipient, and did not
"carry with it the stamp of right."40
Democracies feel ambivalent about private philanthropy: "We
expect rich men to be generous with their wealth and criticize them
when they are not; but when they make benefaction, we question
their motives, deplore the methods by which they obtained their
abundance, and wonder whether their gifts will not do more harm
than good."41 The argument against private philanthropy points to
the "'injudicious multiplication of charitable societies,' 42 whose in-
Communities adopted the English practice of "warning out" undesirable immi-
grants; Massachusetts abolished this practice in the Massachusetts Settlement Act
of 1794. Id.
36. Elizabeth Wisner, The Puritan Background of the New England Poor Laws, 19
Soc. SERV. REV. 381 (1945), reprinted in COMPASSION, supra note 12, at 54.
37. Id. Some colonies distinguished, in theory if not physically, between the
poorhouse for the impotent poor, the workhouse for the "worthy" unemployed,
and the house of correction (or bridewell) for the "unworthy" unemployed
("sturdy beggars"). David M. Schneider, The Patchwork of Relief in Provincial New
York, 1664-1775, 12 Soc. SERV. REV. 464 (1938), reprinted in COMPASSION, supra note
12, at 64, 74; see also BenjaminJ. Klebaner, Poverty and Its Relief in American Thought,
1815-1861, 38 Soc. SERV. REv. 382 (1964), reprinted in COMPASSION, supra note 12, at
114 (tracing historical treatment of poor).
38. Klebaner, supra note 37, at 116. Thus, we see private charities "advo-
cat[ing] temperance, prevention of vice, and character improvement through reli-
gion and education." Id. at 121.
39. Id. at 122-23 (quoting claim that the poor laws breed "generation after
generation of hereditary paupers").
40. Id. at 125.
41. Robert H. Bremner, Private Philanthropy and Public Needs: Historical Perspec-
tive, in 1 COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, RES. PAPERS 89-
90 (U.S. Treas. Dep't 1977) [hereinafter FILER COMM'N RES. PAPERS] (the commis-
sion, discussed infra, notes 246-48 and accompanying text, was chaired byJohn H.
Filer, and so is popularly called the Filer Commission).
42. Klebaner, supra note 37, at 125 (quoting CHARLES BURROUGHS, A Dis-
COURSE DELIVERED IN THE CHAPEL OF THE NEW ALMs-HOUSE 73 (Portsmouth
1835)).
[Vol. 41: p. 433
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efficiencies would result in "aggressive mendicants [receiving]
more than was their due, while the modest would be unprovided
for."43 The twentieth century professionalized its social workers,
some of whom became politically active in order to attack the
causes of poverty, rather than just help clients adapt to their bleak
circumstances." By the Great Depression, when the federal gov-
ernment finally instituted mass relief efforts, "[s]ocial work was
forced to recognize that retail methods no longer sufficed to meet
the desperate needs of millions of citizens." 45 Today, we often hear
that only the government can fairly distribute benefits, free of the
paternalism of private charity.46
The twentieth-century rage to quantify goals and results
changed the very question that charity asks. Andrew Carnegie ap-
plied his innovative business tactics to his charitable endeavors.
The effectiveness of a charitable dollar depends, in part, on the de-
gree to which a particular beneficiary could be helped. Thus, Car-
negie's "scientific philanthropy involved a shift from attending to
the subjectively defined needs of individuals to the eligibility of indi-
viduals for assistance: Were they potentially good investment
vehicles?"47
43. Id. at 127. See also Robert H. Bremner, "Scientific Philanthropy," 1873-93, 30
Soc. SERV. REV. 168 (1956), reprinted in COMPASSION, supra note 12, at 197. The
motto of the scientific philanthropy movement of the 1870s was "Not alms but a
friend." Id. at 199. Its adherents believed that only voluntary agencies, and not
government, should provide (coordinated) relief, and, moreover, that private be-
nevolence should be restrained: "Almsgiving was counterfeit philanthropy; true
charity required something much more demanding-'personal interest in per-
sons."' Id. (quoting WILIAM RHINELANDER STEWART, THE PHILANTHROPIC WORK OF
JOSEPHINE SHAW LOWELL 82 (1911)).
44. One social reformer in 1937 "lashed out at all those who continued 'to
pick up the pieces without ever attempting to stop the breakage.' She thought
caseworkers were particularly guilty of adjusting the client to 'deprivation' without
seeking to correct injustice." Clarke A. Chambers, Social Service and Social Reform: A
Histo7ical Essay, 37 Soc. SERV. REV. 67 (1963) (quoting Grace L. Coyle, Social Work-
ers and Social Action, 73 SURV. 138 (1937)), reprinted in COMPASSION, supra note 12, at
17.
45. Id. at 20.
46. See, e.g., STEVEN R. SMITH & MICHAEL LIPSKY, NONPROFITS FOR HIRE: THE
WELFARE STATE IN THE AGE OF CONTRACTING 18 (1993) ("Robert Reich believes
that the reliance of the United States on the 'ideology of charity' has produced
inadequate, fragmented social programs because citizens in need of relief are not
regarded as entitled to social benefits."). It is important to note that the largest
"entitlements" in the federal budget-social security retirement benefits and Medi-
care coverage for the elderly-are not viewed as charity by their recipients, despite
the fact that payments to the current elderly far outweigh contributions they have
made to these social "insurance" programs.
47. HALL, supra note 1, at 118. 'Just as in his business he had pioneered cost
accounting, so in looking to the larger problems of society he sought to relate
calculable inputs to calculable outputs." Id.
1996]
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Scientific philanthropy made strides in coordinating and ratio-
nalizing the delivery of charitable services. 48 Its emphasis, however,
on eliminating the root causes of poverty had a cruel side.49 Be-
cause "religion stood in the way of putting the unfit out of their
misery," the scientific movement sought instead to prevent poverty
by outlawing marriage by those suffering from insanity, syphilis,
gonorrhea and epilepsy, and by sterilizing criminals. 50 Historian
Peter Dobkin Hall concludes: "Although the rise of fascism made
this kind of thinking unfashionable, . . . through the 1930s, this
kind of social Darwinist brutalism remained perfectly respectable
and continued to dominate the thinking of many grant makers and
the charities that benefited from their largess."51
Compare the era of the Great Society to the current era's de-
bate over welfare reform: "Democrats insist that decency and eq-
uity require Federal standards for aid and a guarantee of help to all
who qualify. Republicans say Federal standards and guarantees
caused the welfare mess by easing the pain and stigma of illegiti-
macy and divorce."52 Once again, the terms of the debate remain
constant, while sectoral choices are likely temporary.
Moreover, the lines between private charities and the public
sector are blurring. Many state income tax forms provide for $1 (or
more) "check-offs" for designated charitable purposes, such as
helping the homeless, preventing child abuse, environmental con-
servation, and education and research.55 For example, in 1994, tax-
payers in Illinois contributed $675,000 to a variety of state
agencies.54 Illinois agencies have also created sister nonprofit orga-
48. See also Paul J. DiMaggio, Constructing an Organizational Field as a Profes-
sional Project: U.S. Art Museums, 1920-1940, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGA-
NIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 267, 288 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991)
[hereinafter THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM] ("Whereas interorganizational contacts
among for-profit firms evoke suspicions of collusion, interaction among nonprofit
firms and their employees is hailed as 'coordination"').
49. HALL, supra note 1, at 131.
50. Id. at 122. Law students remember Justice Holmes's proclamation that
"[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207
(1927) (upholding Virginia's statute requiring sterilization of institutionalized in-
mates afflicted with hereditary insanity or imbecility).
51. HALL, supra note 1, at 122.
52. Michael Wines, "Not My Job." "Not Our Job." So Whose Job Is It?, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 9, 1995, § 4, at 1.
53. Cathlene Williams & Joseph J. Cordes, Eliciting Voluntary Contributions for
thePublic Good Through State Income Tax Check-Offs and Credits, in 1995 IND. SECTOR
WORKING PAP. 549.
54. Sue Ellen Christian, Donors Give DCFS a Boost; Firms, Individuals Ty to Help
Agency's Kids, CHI. TmB., July 10, 1995, at Al.
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nizations to attract donations from those who perceive that they can
thereby better control the use of funds.55
b. The Contract Charity
Most social services today are supplied by "public/private part-
nerships," with tax-funded governments at various levels paying for
the private sector to deliver social services. 56 Government contracts
have become the single largest source of income for nonprofit so-
cial service agencies.5 7 Unfortunately, with the nature of the fund-
ing invisible, the public expresses surprise and confusion when
popular tax cuts jeopardize equally popular social services. 58 While
the federal budget devotes $200 billion a year for poverty relief,
private charities spend only $20 to $30 billion on the poor.59 Yet
before charities can hope to make up proposed reductions in fed-
eral direct transfers, they would first have to make up their own
losses from cutbacks in government contracts. 60
An illustration of the drive to privatize government benefits
through the nonprofit sector appeared in the 1996 presidential
campaign of Republican candidate Lamar Alexander. Alexander
55. Id.
56. Lester M. Salamon, The Marketization of Welfare: Changing Nonprofit and For-
Profit Roles in the American Welfare State, 67 Soc. SERV. REv. 16, 19 (1993) ("As of
1980 ... over 40 percent of the funds spent by federal, state, and local govern-
ments in the United States for a broad range of human service activities supported
service delivery by nonprofit organizations. Almost 20 percent went to support for-
profit providers."). See generally SMITH & LiPsKv, supra note 46 (documenting trend
of public sector's contracting with nonprofits for traditionally public sector
programs).
John O'Looney sorts the possibilities for privatizing social service delivery into
eight archetypal models, ranging from vouchers to managed competition to an
integrated bureaucracy. John O'Looney, Beyond Privatization and Service Integration:
Organizational Models for Service Delivery, 67 Soc. SERv. REv. 501 (1993). These mod-
els variously arrange the features of public and private structure, "loose" and
"tight" coupling (ties between providers), monopoly or competition, economies of
scale, service reliability, innovation, transaction costs (including information
costs), risks to the client, the provider and the government, and power distribution
(including opportunities for "exit" or "voice") among the parties. Id. at 515-16.
57. SMITH & LipsKY, supra note 46, at 4.
58. Indeed, the charitable sector continued to grow during the 1980s primar-
ily due to increased reliance on service fees and product sales. Salamon, supra
note 56, at 24 (stating that between 1977 and 1989, private giving accounted for
15% of overall growth of nonprofit sector, commercial income accounted for 55%
of growth, and government support accounted for 30% of growth). "What is
more, [commercial income] was the principal source of growth of every major type
of organization except for arts organizations .... Id. at 26.
59. Dana Milbank, U.S. Charities Fear They Will Be Overwhelmed, Not Empowered,
by Republican Welfare Cutbacks, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 1995, at A24. "To offset [these
cutbacks], the charities would need giving to increase 247% by the year 2002." Id.
60. Id.
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proposed to eliminate entirely two federal welfare programs, food
stamps and Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and transfer
their funding to community charities. He also supported a pro-
posed federal income tax credit for contributions up to $500 made
to charities that fight poverty. Republican nominee Bob Dole
picked up this latter proposal, albeit much scaled back in dollar
terms.61
c. Privatopia: The Shrinking Community
Recent taxpayer revolts, and the resulting financial pressures
on local government, have forced a re-evaluation of the meaning of
"community." In the residential sphere, the explosion in the
number and size of condominiums, housing cooperatives and
planned-unit developments effectively transforms homeowner as-
sociations into private governments. 62
The commercial sphere has seen the growth of business im-
provement districts ("BIDs"), which are small geographic areas
whose landowners fund common services such as security and street
improvements. 63 Landowners are willing to fund these benefits be-
cause they can see the results. Moreover, BIDs avoid the "baggage
of municipal politics and the inherent inefficiencies of the city's
bureaucracy."4 Critics, though, express concern about the BIDs'
growing size and lack of general accountability. 65
61. Kevin Sack, Alexander Builds His Hopes on Some Radical Departures, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 1996, at A18. Senator Dan Coats (Republican, Indiana) sponsored
a $500 credit in October 1995. Sean O'Brien, Coats Touts $500 Credit for Charitable
Giving, 69 TAx NOTES 424 (Oct. 23, 1995). For a description of candidate Dole's
proposal, see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
62. See generally EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND
THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT (1994) (discussing trend of residen-
tial communities amounting to private governmental units); see also Pam Belluck,
In Era of Shrinking Budgets, Community Groups Blossom, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1996, at
Al ("Across New York City and the country, neighborhood groups are growing in
number and strength, in some cases taking on responsibilities once the sole prov-
ince of government, and in other cases turning themselves into effective lobbying
groups for their communities.").
63. Let the Landlords Do It, ECONOMIST, Apr. 15, 1992, at 23 ("[Business Im-
provement Districts ("BIDs")] raise mandatory taxes on the businesses within their
boundaries and use the proceeds to provide security, rubbish collection, tourist
guides, street improvements and even rudimentary social services.").
64. Id. at 24 (observing, however, that director of several New York City BIDs
earns twice as much as mayor).
65. Id. (noting that New York City and state politicians "want to curb BIDs by
curtailing the amount of debt they can take on and limiting their life to ten
years"). Furthermore, "[t]he districts, they say, are becoming cities within cities,
doing public work without elected control; they are diverting resources from need-
ier parts for the benefit of business, and creating two-tier government in an already
fractured and tense city." Id.
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B. Proprietary Businesses Enter "Traditionally" Nonprofit or
Public Areas
1. The Rise of the Investor-Owned Hospital
Responsible for the sick poor, colonial local governments es-
tablished hospitals as an efficient alternative to contracting with
physicians for customary house calls. 66 Early hospitals often served
merely as "a refuge for friendless and infirm poor," as the term hos-
pital suggests. 67 Hospitals also engaged in curing illness, medical
research and training, all of which benefited donors and the
community.68
Modern nonprofit hospitals depend little on contributions.
Third-party reimbursements such as Medicare, Medicaid and pri-
vate insurance can make hospital operations self-sustaining, if not
profitable.69 As a result, seventeen percent of hospitals are now
proprietary.70 Similar economic forces drive nonprofit hospitals
and for-profit hospitals to resemble each other. Hospitals face in-
creasing costs and competitive pressures. 71 Occasionally, a non-
profit hospital's need to achieve efficient operations clashes with
traditional goals. For example, the Archdiocese of Chicago re-
cently stripped St. Elizabeth's Hospital of its identity as a Roman
Catholic institution. The church determined that by affiliating with
a University of Chicago Hospital managed-care plan, St. Elizabeth's
66. Schneider, supra note 37, at 90.
67. Id. at 89-90.
68. Ralph E. Pumphrey, Compassion and Protection: Dual Motivations in Social
Welfare, 33 Soc. SERV. REV. 21 (1959), reprinted in COMPASSION, supra note 12, at 5,
12 (quoting Benjamin Franklin as saying Pennsylvania Hospital "was to be open to
paying patients only if there were beds available after all public cases were taken
care of").
69. The federal payment structure under Medicare has changed in recent
years, but in the first twenty years of the program, the payment methods "were a
major factor behind the creation and growth of investor-owned hospitals." BRAn-
FORD H. GRAY, THE PROFIT MOTIVE AND PATIENT CARE 6 (1991); see also id. at 31-60
(describing evolution of investor-owned hospital companies).
70. As of 1989, for-profits made up 17% of hospitals, up from 13% in 1980;
for-profits accounted for 80% of the new day-centers, 45% of new residential care
facilities, and 39% of the job training and vocational rehabilitation facilities (for-
profits represented 36% of all such social service firms in 1977). Salamon, supra
note 56, at 29, 32. Conversely, for-profits made up 77% of nursing homes, down
from 82% in 1977. Id. at 33-34. As the federal and state governments sought to
restrain Medicaid costs, "it was the nonprofit firms that moved to meet the de-
mand in the constrained climate of the 1980s." Id. at 34.
71. See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, Columbia-Presbyterian Seeks a Merger, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 1995, at A16 (reporting that insurers, particularly HMOs, have little
interest in cross-subsidizing sophisticated technology and training).
19961
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engaged in "undue competition" with a neighboring Catholic
hospital. 72
Most unsettling to the public, and to state and federal charity
regulators, is the recent wave of nonprofit hospital "conversions."
These transformations from nonprofit to for-profit enterprise often
take the form of a joint operating agreement between a nonprofit
hospital and a proprietary company, or the outright sale of non-
profit hospital assets to an investor-owned chain. In October 1996,
George Washington University signed an $80 million preliminary
agreement granting an 80% interest in the George Washington
University Hospital to OrNda HealthCorp, the third-largest hospital
company in the country.73 In the new atmosphere, Columbia Uni-
versity has filed a trademark and unfair competition lawsuit against
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., accusing it, in the words of The
Wall Street Journal, of "poaching on its venerable Ivy League
name."
7 4
Even the public sector is feeling the financial pressure. In the
country's first private effort to rescue a public hospital, the Boston
City Council recently approved an arrangement converting the Bos-
ton City Hospital into ajoint venture with Boston University's medi-
cal center. 75
2. For-Profit Schools7 6
In May 1992, Yale University President Benno Schmidt stunned
his board by resigning to head a venture to develop proprietary
schools. He told the press:
At first, frankly, I thought the notion that I would leave
the presidency of a 300-year-old institution for something
so new and risky was outlandish, like leaping into the
abyss. But if this venture succeeds, . . . there's nothing
72. Paul Galloway, Catholic Hospital Loses Ties, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 20, 1996, § 2, at
1.
73. Amy Goldstein, Tenn. Firm to Take Over GWUHospital, WASH. POST, Oct. 26,
1996, at Al (quoting George Washington's Vice President of Medical Affairs as
saying, "The world has changed against us").
74. Lucette Lagnado, What's In a Name? Columbia University Says a Whole Lot,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 1996, at B4 (reporting statement by university official:
"There is a fundamental distinction here between the medicine that we repre-
sent-not-for-profit research academic centers-and a for-profit hospital chain.").
75. Philip J. Hilts, City and University Hospitals in Boston to Merge, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 1996, at A14.
76. The very concept of what constitutes a school is undergoing change. See,
e.g., Ann Podd, Business Bulletin, WALL ST. J., June 8, 1995, at Al (reporting that
companies are examining college accreditation for their own degrees).
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that could be done, aside from changing human nature,
that would be more constructive for our society.77
No doubt Schmidt's $800,000 salary with his new employer en-
couraged his leap of faith.78
Schmidt joined the Edison Project, a brain child of Christo-
pher Whittle. Whiz-kid Whittle already had rocked public-school
culture with his Channel One satellite network. Channel One of-
fers a "Faustian bargain": In return for free equipment, public
schools must show all students a daily-twelve minute news program
with two minutes of ads. 79 In describing the Edison Project, Whit-
tle, ever the self-proclaimed visionary, eerily echoed early nine-
teenth-century Protestant stewards of industry by declaring: "This
would be better than public life: A mission and free enterprise. A
blend of capitalism and mission. This goes to the heart of the de-
bate: Should capitalism be in the public sector? I felt this as a real
calling."80
Three years later, in August 1994, the corporate parents of a
collapsing Whittle Communications stripped Whittle of his interests
in everything but the Edison Project.81 Even this lone base ap-
peared uncertain. The New Yorker predicted that "[o] nce the public-
school administrators of America have absorbed the magnitude of
Whittle's failure with his other ventures they are hardly likely to
trust him with their tax dollars, let alone their children."8 2 In
March 1995, Benno Schmidt found new outside investment to keep
77. Associated Press, Yale President Resigns: Schmidt to Develop Chain of Private
Schools, WASH. POST, May 26, 1992, at A5 (reporting that Whittle Communications
intended to spend $60 million developing network of one thousand profit-making
private schools, called Edison Project).
78. James B. Stewart, Grand Illusion, NEW YORKER, Oct. 31, 1994, at 64, 74.
79. Patrick M. Reilly, A KKR Vehicle Finds Profit and Education a Rich But Uneasy
Mix, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1994, at Al. Profitable Channel One reaches 40% of
secondary schools. Id. Whittle Communications sold it for $250 million to a sub-
sidiary of Kolhberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (controller of tobacco giant RJR
Nabisco). Id. Advertisements are finding other ways into schools: One El Paso
County school district hopes to raise $300,000 annually from dozens of ads dis-
played on school hallways and stadium walls, on school buses, and in newsletters
and reports. School Sells Ads to Plug Budget Gap, AP, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 13, 1994, § 1, at
12. Another company, owned by Hughes Electronics (a subsidiary of General Mo-
tors), hopes to be able to bring educational shows into classrooms without also
carrying advertisements, but this requires charging schools a subscription fee of
thousands of dollars. Sarah Lubman, TV or Not TV? Schools Test Hughes Idea, WALL
ST.J., Mar. 20, 1995, at B1.
80. Stewart, supra note 78, at 72.
81. Id. at 64.
82. Id. at 80.
19961
17
Brody: Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the Edison Project going, while squeezing Whittle's role.8 3 Happily,
the four schools operated by Edison during the 1995-96 school year
produced promising results. Predicts The New York Times: "Districts
around the country are increasingly giving Edison a long look, and
investors who once shunned the company are now showing so
much interest that Edison seems destined to become a publicly
traded company within a few years. 8 4
A suburban Pittsburgh school district recently granted another
proprietary venture, Alternative Public Schools of Nashville, the au-
thority to replace existing teachers. In the opinion of the teachers
union, this was "'union busting, plain and simple."'8 5 The union
won a preliminary injunction. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
however, in a 4-to-2 decision vacated and remanded, directing an
evidentiary hearing. The court described the deplorable situation
in the affected school and emphasized that "the best interest of the
child is the polestar."8 6
While companies experience difficulties obtaining contracts to
run school districts, proprietary businesses take in $30 billion of the
$340 billion spent annually on education below the college level.
Businesses fill niches in classroom teaching, tutoring and remedial
education, provide computers and software, and design curricula.
83. Barbara Carton, Edison Project Is Given New Financing in Move Reducing Role
of Its Founder, WALL ST.J., Mar. 17, 1995, at B7. Meanwhile, a competitor, publicly
traded Education Alternatives, Inc., won and then lost contracts to run public
schools in Dade County, Florida, Baltimore, Maryland, and Hartford, Connecticut.
In 1995, Dade County decided not to renew its expiring contract. Steve Strecklow,
Florida Pact to End for Education Alternatives, Inc, WALL ST. J., May 2, 1995, at B10.
County officials found that while attendance and test scores improved, test scores
improved at a similar rate at a comparable, publicly-run school. In November
1995, Baltimore terminated its contract. Hartford followed shortly thereafter, pull-
ing out in January 1996. See, e.g., Rick Green, Officials Considering Paying Part of EAI
Bill, Retaining Firm, HARTFORD CouRNr, Feb. 14, 1996, at A3. Education Alterna-
tives, Inc. (EAI) clings to a single ray of hope: a $100,000 consulting contract that
it won in February 1996 on a 5-4 vote from a small school district near Poughkeep-
sie, New York. George Judson, School Consultant's Job Is Company's 2d Chance, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 1996, at B12. EAI's stock had plunged from $48.75 in 1993 to
$4.50 in mid-February 1996, a value that it has maintained as of mid-October 1996.
84. Peter Applebome, Grading For-Profit Schools: So Far, So Good, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 1996, at Al; see also Ross Kerber, Edison Project Completes Funding for $30.5
Million, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1996, at A10. For a scholarly analysis of the proprie-
tary school experiences and the economic and political constraints under which
they have been operating, see Douglas J. Lamdin, The Economics of Provision by
For-Profit Contractors (Oct. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Villanova
Law Review).
85. Peter Applebome, Private Company Given Power to Pick Teachers, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 9, 1995, at A26 (quoting Barbara Bell, affected elementary school teacher and
union negotiator).
86. Wilkinsburg Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Wilkinsburg, 667 A.2d 5, 13
(Pa. 1995).
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Many schools also contract for support services, including food,
transportation, maintenance and security.8 7
3. Welfare Capitalism
Corporate employers have long offered health care benefits,
pensions, profit-sharing plans, educational benefits, and, recently,
on-site child care facilities for their employees as examples of "wel-
fare capitalism." Samuel Gompers, the first president of the Ameri-
can Federation of Labor, opposed government social programs
because they competed with the allure of fringe benefits in enticing
workers to join unions. 88 Unions, of course, are another specie of
nonprofit organization.
On a broader scale, spurred by recent welfare reform, proprie-
tary companies have already started seeking some of the billions of
dollars in potentially available government contracts. For example,
a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin is bidding against Electronic Data
Systems and Andersen Consulting to manage Texas's welfare opera-
tions. To state and local officials, facing lump-sum grants in lieu of
a guarantee of federal aid to the poor, "a fixed-price contract with a
corporation has strong appeal."8 9
C. Nonprofits Exhibiting "Traditionally" Proprietary Behavior
1. The Merger of God and Mammon
Leave it to cyberspace to bring us word of the merger between
the largest nonprofit organization and the most visible business cor-
poration. A spoof disguised as an Associated Press wire story, titled
"Microsoft Bids to Acquire Catholic Church," flashed through the
Internet in early December 1994.90 The hoax press release de-
scribed how Microsoft would gain exclusive electronic rights to the
Bible; Pope John Paul II would become a senior vice president; and
two Microsoft vice presidents would be invested in the College of
Cardinals.91 Microsoft President Bill Gates was quoted as saying
"[t]he combined resources of Microsoft and the Catholic Church
will allow us to make religion easier and more fun for a broader
87. Peter Applebome, Lure of the Education Market Remains Strong for Business,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1996, at Al.
88. BRUCE S. JANSSON, THE RELUCTANT WELFARE STATE 232 (1988).
89. Nina Bernstein, Giant Companies Entering Race to Run State Welfare Programs,
N.Y. TIsS, Sept. 15, 1996, at Al.
90. See, e.g., Bigger Than Jesus?, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1994, at A14.
91. Paul Andrews, A Messagefor Microsoft: Lighten Up; It Was Just ajoke, SEATTLE
TIMES, Dec. 17, 1994, at Al. A copy of this Internet-carried "release" is available
from the author.
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range of people."92 Talk-show host Rush Limbaugh read the re-
lease aloud on his nationally syndicated television program. 93 Dis-
tressed listeners protested to Microsoft, which issued a disclaimer
and apology "to anyone who was offended by the document."94
"Offended?" responded John A. McCoy, a spokesman for the
Roman Catholic Church in western Washington. "We thought our
prayers had finally been answered." Indeed, McCoy put out a fax of
his own, headlined: "Church Hopes Dashed as Microsoft Denies
Acquisition Bid."95 Yet life has begun to imitate art. The Vatican
celebrated Christmas 1995 by debuting its home page on the World
Wide Web. 96 The site registered more than a million hits in its first
two weeks; most visitors accessed the Pope's Christmas message in a
choice of six languages. Some addressed e-mail questions directly
to the Pope. He, however, rarely uses his computer.
A series in The New York Times on "megachurches" covered top-
ics ranging from the "mall culture" of big-time religion to lessons
that megachurches have learned from the business sector.97 Origi-
nally, technology transfer probably went in the other direction.
Post-revolutionary New England clergymen taught the rationales
and methods of voluntary religious associations to the newly devel-
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Microsoft Forced to Deny Wild Rumor on Internet, REUTER Bus. REP.,
Dec. 16, 1994.
94. Peter H. Lewis, And the Spoof Begat a News Release, and Another, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 1994, § 1, at 53.
95. Id. Mr. McCoy's release described several reasons why the deal might be
mutually beneficial, including: "We've had 2,000 years of working with icons.
Microsoft has only done it for three. We could have helped." Id.
96. See Celestine Bohlen, Pope John Paul @ Vatican: How Many Angels Can
Dance... , N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1996, § 1, at 6 (visited Nov. 11, 1996) <http://
www.vatican.va/>; see also Ex-Bishop Opens On-Line Diocese, AP, CHI. TRmB., Jan. 15,
1996, § 1, at 8 (quoting fired French bishop on French television: "Being able to
communicate in borderless space is something new. Young people are all inter-
ested in this new form of communication"); Adam Gopnik, The Virtual Bishop, NEW
YORKER, Mar. 18, 1996, at 59 (reporting on this bishop's virtual diocese, which
exists only on Web); cf Edmund S. Tijerina, Wired to God, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL J.,
Nov. 30, 1996, at B2 (setting forth Website addresses for various churches and
religious organizations).
97. Gustav Niebuhr, Where Religion Gets a Big Dose of Shopping-Mall Culture, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 16, 1995, at Al; Gustav Niebuhr, The Minister as Marketer: Learning From
Business, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1995, at Al; Paul Goldberger, The Gospel of Church
Architecture, Revised, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1995, at Cl; Gustav Niebuhr, Protestantism
Shifts Toward a New Model of How "Church" Is Done, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1995, at A12.
See also, e.g., Fara Warner, Churches Turn to Marketing Plans to Spread Their Spiritual
Message, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 1995, at B4.
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oping business corporations.9" Their theology of "moral agency"
viewed material wealth, as well as human endowments, as property
held in trust for the service of God. As Professor Hall writes, ac-
cording to Leonard Bacon of New Haven "men should strive for
achievement-and should actively seek material gain-because ju-
dicious use of wealth and talent was a measure of one's worthiness
to be the steward of greater and more enduring forms of spiritual
wealth." 99
2. Is It Art or Is It Commerce?
One can find a branch of the Metropolitan Museum of Art gift
shop in Macy's department store. 10 0 Likewise, one could pick up
that essential Art Institute of Chicago reproduction scarf in a chic
mall on Michigan Avenue. 10 1 This is really nothing new. The New
York Times recently quizzed its readers: "Where did the first Cubist
art show in America take place?" The answer: Gimbels. 10 2 Early
museums were mere places of "amusement." Department stores
cultivated customer taste, and encouraged acquisitive natures in the
new bourgeoisie, by displaying fine art. Observed the Times: "To-
day it is demeaning to say about a museum like the Met that it re-
sembles a department store. But one of the dirty secrets of
American cultural history is that these two great offspring of the
98. PETER DOBKIN HALL, RELIGION AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL REVOLUTION IN
THE UNITED STATES 11-12 (Yale Univ. Program on Non-Profit Organizations, Work-
ing Paper No. 208, Sept. 1994).
99. Id.; cf. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residuals
Claims, 26J.L. & ECON. 327, 343 (1983). The authors state:
Some argue that the sale of some products and services (for example,
religion) is not acceptable and that this explains the nonprofit form in
these activities.... When giving outputs away generates more resources
through donations than sale, survival dictates the nonprofit form ...
Churches usually do not insist on payment of admission charges or mem-
ber taxes because they attract more total resources through voluntary
contributions.
Id.
100. See, e.g., Joshua Levine, Art Chic, FORBES, Aug. 21, 1989, at 94 (reporting
Metropolitan Museum of Art's expansion of its museum stores into nontraditional
locations). The Met has satellite stores in the New York City Public Library and
Macy's department store at Herald Square. Id. The museum also has shops in
malls in Short Hills, NewJersey, in Stamford and West Hartford, Connecticut, and
even in Columbus, Ohio. Id. The Met's museum shop sales totaled $65 million in
1988. Id.
101. Alan G. Artner, Artistic License, CHI. TmB., July 20, 1995, § 5, at 1, 2.
102. Michael Kimmelman, Art in Aisle 3, by Lingerie, and Feel Free to Browse, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 1995, § 2, at 43.
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late 19th century have been linked together from the beginning,
dancing a kind of high-culture-low-culture pas de deux." l0 3
When I first visited the Temple of Dendur at the Met, I
thought the space dwarfing the temple was wastefully empty. My
mistake was seeing it during museum hours. For the real-estate-
squeezed elite of New York City, the museum is "Club Met," the
place to hold weddings, birthday parties and corporate entertain-
ments.10 4 As of 1989, for a "donation" of $30,000 (in addition to
actual costs), anyone can "party at the palace."' 10 5 Having recently
added six new wings at a cost of $200 million, the Met's voracious
appetite for funds happily coincided with the conspicuous con-
sumption of the 1980s newly rich. Punch Sulzberger, chairman of
the Met's board (and then publisher of The New York Times), asked:
"If it's going to be dark, and someone's going to pay thousands of
dollars to open it up, why not open it up?"10 6
3. Executive Compensation: The United Way Scandal
Contending for the top nonprofit story of the "sober" 1990s is
the exposure and disgrace of William Aramony, the former long-
time president of United Way of America.10 7 The disclosure of his
high salary and lavish perks provoked public outrage.' 08 The scan-
dal triggered a rebellion in the ranks of the local, independent
United Ways. Initially, about 750 of the local organizations with-
103. Id. Also, consider Chicago's Marshall Field's department store and the
Field Museum of Natural History.
104. John Taylor, Party Palace: The High Life at the Gilded Metropolitan Museum,
NEW YoRK, Jan. 9, 1989, at 20, 22 (quoting social columnist Billy Norwich).
105. The museum has several functions a night on the three nights a week it
permits parties. Id. To Hilton Kramer, the Temple of Dendur has no function but
to serve as a party hall. Id. at 28.
106. Id. at 23.
107. Only the Foundation for New Era Philanthropy can claim a greater de-
gree of hubris and greed. See, e.g., Steve Stecklow, False Profit's: How New Era's Boss
Led Rich and Gullible Into a Web of Deceit, WALL ST.J., May 19, 1995, at Al (reporting
Foundation's offer to double contributions from charities with money from anony-
mous donor revealed as Ponzi scheme; charities and donors file claims for lost
millions); Steve Stecklow, New Era's Head Charged with Fraud, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30,
1996, at A3 (describing 82-count federal criminal indictment for fraud, money
laundering and tax evasion).
108. Aramony received total compensation of $463,000 a year, flew the Con-
corde, and used chauffeured cars on his frequent trips to New York, where he
stayed in a $430,000 condominium purchased primarily for his use by a subsidiary
corporation. Charles E. Shepard, Perks, Privileges and Power in a Nonprofit World,
WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1992, at Al [hereinafter Shepard, Perks].
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held their voluntary payments to the national. 10 9 Meanwhile, the
locals braced for a drop-off in contributions from the public." 0
Aramony insisted that his compensation fairly reflected his
achievements and the $29 million budget he supervised. The local
United Ways, too, were satisfied that they got their money's worth
from the national organization through training and promotion."'
A Washington Post editorial observed: "The salaries of executives in
big-time philanthropy are always a matter of controversy, and one
side of the argument points out that these executives are running
organizations that are among other things big businesses."" 2
A second Washington Post editorial, however, turned the focus
from the chief executive to the board of directors: "Where was [the
United Way of America's] board while its staff was flying the Con-
corde to Europe? The board has traditionally been composed
largely of leading figures from the corporate world-people who
brought prestige to it, but put little time into it."' " 3 In fact, the
United Way resembles corporate America because it was created by
corporate America, receiving most of its funding from workplace
payroll deductions. 11 4 This "corporate" mentality limited the dar-
ingness of the charities that the United Way was willing to fund,
109. Charles E. Shepard, United Way of America Adopts New Ethics Rules, Safe-
guards, WASH. POST, June 26, 1992, at A2 [hereinafter Shepard, Safeguards]; see
Wendy Melillo, Community-Wide Giving Launched 105 Years Ago, WASH. POST, Feb.
16, 1992, at A39.
110. Shepard, Perks, supra note 108, at A38.
111. Charles R Babcock, 3 Large Locals Ask National United Way About Presi-
dent's Spending, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1992, at A6. One long-time United Way exec-
utive said, "When Aramony took over, we were a very weak movement and we did
not have a common name in the field." Melillo, supra note 109, at A39.
112. Opinion Editorial, A Charitable Salary, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 1992, at A24.
Elsewhere, the Post also noted that some "contend that the public expects frugality
beyond reason." Shepard, Perks, supra note 108, at A38. Meanwhile, the press ex-
tensively covered the dispute between the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People (NAACP) and its executive director Benjamin Chavis.
The NAACP fired Chavis (who enjoyed a $200,000 salary plus expenses and a hous-
ing allowance) for agreeing to pay up to $332,400 of NAACP money to settle a
sexual harassment suit by a former assistant. NAACP Sues Ousted Leader for Repay-
ment, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 23, 1994, § 1, at 18; see NAACP, Chavis Settle Lawsuit Out of
Court, Cm. TPIB., Oct. 22, 1994, § 1, at 6.
113. Opinion Editorial, United Way's Breach of Trust, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1992,
at A24. The organization adopted a code of ethics requiring more local represen-
tation on the board and created new committees on ethics, budget and finance,
compensation and personnel, services and membership. Shepard, Safeguards,
supra note 109, at A2.
114. The locals raised $3.1 billion in contributions in 1990, of which $2.2 bil-
lion came from automatic payroll deductions. Melillo, supra note 109, at A39. Re-
call the discussion of Midwestern federationism, supra notes 23-25 and
accompanying text.
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particularly before the donor-choice rebellion. It also explains why
the board failed to anticipate the public revulsion to high sala-
ries. 115 Indeed, Aramony once quipped, "A cardinal rule... is that
you never put anyone on your Board who makes less than you
do."1 1
6
Initially, observers saw no violations of law.117 Then came the
bombshell: A multi-count indictment charged Aramony with fraud-
ulently diverting hundreds of thousands of dollars to personal use
and filing false tax returns." 8 Aramony argued that the board was
fully aware of his activities. After an entire week of deliberation, a
jury convicted Aramony on twenty-five counts. 119 He received a
seven-year prison term which he appealed.120 While the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed most of his convictions, it vacated
one and thus remanded for resentencing. 121
D. Higher Education
The world of higher education serves as a microcosm of all the
issues discussed above: blurred boundaries between public and pri-
vate sectors, expansion into commercial activities, and "inappropri-
ate" behavior resulting from pressures to survive.
1. Harvard: The First U.S. Nonprofit Organization
As originally established, Harvard University counted most of
its revenues from legislative grants, tuition and fees. The state legis-
lature debated its curriculum. Not until 1865 did state senators
cease to sit as overseers, by which time state influence had
atrophied. 122
115. GLASER, supra note 23, at 36, 37.
116. Id. at 114.
117. Bruce R. Hopkins, Afterword to GLASER, supra note 23, at 259. "Readers
may find this statement hard to believe, but ... Bill Aramony did not break a single
federal law." Id.
118. Former United Way Head Indicted, CH. TRIB., Sept. 14, 1994, § 1, at 8 (re-
porting that charitable funds of $1.5 million were used for personal trips).
119. Karen W. Arenson, Former United Way Chief Guilty in Theft of More Than
$600,000, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1995, at Al.
120. High Life Sends Ex-United Way Boss to Prison, Cm. TRIB., June 23, 1995, at
A3; Prosecution of Ex-Charity Head is Faulted, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1996, at A21
(describing oral argument on appeal).
121. United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369 (4th Cir. 1996).
122. HALL, supra note 1, at 17.
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2. University Finances and Governance
Just before Thanksgiving break in November 1994, Harvard
University President Neil L. Rudenstine failed to make scheduled
fundraising meetings; he was found asleep at home. His doctors
immediately placed him on medical leave to recover from severe
fatigue and exhaustion.123 Rudenstine was six months into a five-
year capital campaign to raise $2.1 billion-which works out to over
a million dollars a day-even though, at $6 billion, Harvard's en-
dowment was already the largest university endowment in the
country.
With varying degrees of regret, modern university presidents
predominantly see themselves as administrators rather than schol-
ars. 124 Former Vice Chairman of Xerox Corp. and now President of
Babson College, William Glavin, said: "I do not believe that aca-
demic institutions have got to be run by academics. They need to
be run like a business, more cost-effective and efficient."1 25 George
Washington University President Stephen Trachtenberg claims he
tells people "I run a conglomerate in Washington, D.C., which has
residential accommodations, dining facilities, athletic clubs, book-
stores, health facilities . . . [,] that last year our budget exceeded
$500 million, and that, on the side, we do some education."1 26
Recently, the academic world watched in horror as Yale Univer-
sity handed back a $20 million gift from Lee Bass.127 Bass had des-
ignated the gift to be used for teaching Western Civilization,
derided by campus proponents of multiculturalism as the "dead
123. Karen W. Arenson, A Harvard Leave Highlights the Pressures of University
Life, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1994, § 1, at 34.
124. Mary Jordan, Wanted: Presidents for US. Universities-Higher Stress, Lower
Prestige and New Focus on Fund-Raising Contribute to Swift Turnover, WASH. POST, June
14, 1992, at A4.
125. Maryann Haggerty & Joel G. Brenner, The Campus as Corporation, WASH.
POST, Mar. 11, 1991, at F3.
126. Id. Indeed, a few proprietary institutions of higher education have
grown so successful that they have become publicly traded. The Apollo Group's
University of Phoenix has 35,000 enrolled adult students at 70 U.S. campuses, and
thousands more are engaged in distance learning offered by Apollo through on-
line programs. A Haven from Prejudice: With Academia Elsewhere Closed to Teaching for
Profit, the Company's Boss Turned to Arizona, FIN. TIMES, May 21, 1996, at 5. Explain-
ing why its campuses have no clubs, dormitories, bars or sports facilities, founder
John Sperling explains: "This is a corporation, not a social entity .... The most
precious thing our students possess is their time. Coming here is not a rite of
passage. We are not trying to develop their value systems or go in for that 'expand
the mind' bull****." Id.
127. See, e.g., Andrew Delbanco, Contract with Academia, NEW YORKER, Mar. 27,
1995, at 7 (reporting on "largest rescinded donation, apparently, in the history of
American education").
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white male" curriculum. 128 The University dawdled for years before
admitting its inability to implement such a program. 12 9 The Bass
episode recalls a Doonesbury cartoon from the 1970s in which the
university president, King, leans across his desk to an elderly alum-
nus and asks hopefully: "Thank you for your generous offer, but we
already have a very fine gymnasium; how would you like to endow
our African-American Studies Center?"
In contrast to Yale's lethargy over the Bass grant, some univer-
sities have become willing to sue donors who fail to satisfy large
pledges, which often fund capital building projects. °3 0 Charities
rarely sue living donors. The cases typically arise after a donor dies,
having failed to provide for the gift in his or her will. The charity
claims to be following through on the donor's wishes, although to
the detriment of the heirs.
In the high stakes world of college athletics, universities turn
increasingly to corporate sponsorship contracts. We have all wit-
nessed the boundary-blurring commercialization of college football
bowl games. More recently, Rutgers University signed a 10-year,
$10 million deal with Coca-Cola, providing that only Coke products
may be served in university dining halls, available in vending ma-
chines and campus stores, and even poured over the heads of victo-
rious athletes.1 3 ' Nike closed a $5.7 million multi-year deal with the
University of Michigan, a state school.13 2 Michigan's athletic direc-
tor commented: "The question is whether the commercialism con-
trols the program and does bad things to it, and I don't think this
does.... If we're going to be into it, we might as well get as much
128. See, e.g., Yale to Return Millions with Strings Attached, CHI. Tam., Mar. 15,
1995, § 1 at 20 (describing how university lost gift).
129. See Barbara Carton, Yale, Unwilling to Cede Faculty Control, Decides to Return
$20 Million Bass Gift, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 1995, at B2 (recounting statements by
John L. Lee, a Yale trustee and chair of Yale's $1.5 billion, five-year fund-raising
campaign, who explained that long-running negotiations with Lee Bass occurred
through "three administrations in three years, three presidents, and three
provosts," resulting in "the very poor handoff of the ball"); see also Yale Explains Bass
Gift; Original Version, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1995, at A14 (reporting on controversy
surrounding Bass gift).
130. Richard B. Schmitt, If Donors Fail to Give, More Nonprofit Groups Take Them
to Court, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1995, at Al.
131. See, e.g., Maria Mallory, The Cola Wars Go to College, Bus. WK., Sept. 19,
1994, at 42 (reporting on colleges' acceptance of contracts with soft drink makers).
132. Andrew Gottesman, Taking License: Corporate Logos Intermingle with School
Colors, CHI. Tam., Dec. 4, 1994, § 3, at 1. It appears that Michigan closed this deal
without first bringing it to the attention of its governing board. Id. at 15.
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as we can." At the same time, one analyst termed the Michigan
contract a coup for Nike.133
3. Competition Among Universities13 4
a. Lying to Rating Services
In a front-page story subtitled "Cheat Sheets," The Wall Street
Journal reported the widespread practice among colleges of shading
the statistics that they provide to editors of college handbooks.
Schools want to appear more selective, and so they drop off the
standard aptitude test scores of some of their special admissions stu-
dents. Many schools also fudge information about applications, ad-
mittances, enrollments and graduation rates. The Journal reported
that, in contrast, the same schools provide much less favorable
numbers to Moody's and Standard & Poor's, the agencies that rate
the tax-exempt debt the schools issue. The Journal noted that lying
to ratings agencies violates federal securities laws.' 3 5
b. Tuition Price Wars
Economic and demographic factors have unsettled the notion
of fixed tuition. Colleges now use financial aid not just to assist
needy students ("need-based financial aid"), but also to attract qual-
ity students ("merit-based financial aid"), and sometimes simply to
maintain class size.' 36 One business school dean told The New York
Times, "I think we're going to see increasingly more aggressive and
creative and sometimes desperate pricing schemes." Another edu-
cator commented: "[T]he whole price structure of higher educa-
tion, particularly in the private sector, is collapsing, and there will
be a lot of. . . novel experiments .... The market is trying to...
clear, and find out the real price the public is willing to pay for
higher education." 137
133. Id. Corporate sponsors view these types of contracts as substitutes for
advertising, leading observers to predict that "only the most successful schools with
huge national followings are likely to win such contracts." Id. at 1.
134. See also William Celis III, Newest Sport on Campus: Steal That Research Lab,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1994, § 1, at 1.
135. Steve Stecklow, Colleges Inflate SATs and Graduation Rates in Popular Guide-
books, WALL ST. J., April 5, 1995, at Al.
136. Peter Applebome, Colleges Luring Students with Discounts in Tuition, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 25, 1994, at Al.
137. Id.; see also Steve Stecklow, Colleges Manipulate Financial-Aid Offers, Short-
changing Many, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1996, at Al (reporting on financial aid for
college students); Steve Stecklow, Some Small Colleges Hire Recruiters to Get Bigger
Freshman Class, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1995, at Al (reporting on aggressive approach
to increasing student enrollment).
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c. Ivy League Antitrust Violations
In May 1991, the Justice Department entered into a consent
decree in which Brown, Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth, Harvard,
Princeton, Yale and Pennsylvania-members of the "Overlap
Group"-agreed to avoid future collusion on tuition, salaries and
financial aid.' 38 The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT),
also a participant, refused to settle. MIT defended on the legal
ground that financial aid, as a charitable activity, is not subject to
the Sherman Antitrust Act. l39 MIT lost at trial, but a split three-
judge panel of the Third Circuit reversed and remanded, ordering
the trial judge to reconsider MIT's social welfare argument.140
Before a new trial began, MIT and the Justice Department settled,
with MIT agreeing to be bound by the consent decree already en-
tered into by the other members of the Overlap Group.14'
d. Education as Contract
With the new view of higher education as a business, it was
bound to happen. Two students in an adult computer science
course sued Pace University for a tuition refund plus punitive dam-
ages, because the course demanded more math competency than
the school had led the students to expect. The students won. Small
claims court judge Thomas Dickerson found that "[s]tudents are
consumers of educational services. There is nothing holy or sacred
about educational institutions." 142
138. Gary Putka, Ivy League Discussions on Finances Extended to Tuition and Sala-
ries, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1992, at Al. According to Putka, enforcing the cartel
proved difficult but attainable except in rare cases. For example, Dartmouth com-
plained that Harvard unilaterally reduced the net tuition cost to a student whom
the two schools had accepted. "I'm very unhappy with [Harvard's] actions on this
squeeze play," wrote the Dartmouth assistant financial aid officer to his boss. "This
kid is supposedly the [illegible] soccer player in the country! Either we have an
agreement we all stick to or we do not have an agreement. I'm tired of being
taken advantage of." Id. at A5 (alterations in original).
139. Debbie Goldberg, U.S. Price-Fixing Case Against MIT is Opened, WASH.
POST, June 26, 1992, at A3.
140. United States v. Brown University, 5 F.3d 658, 661 (3d Cir. 1993).
141. MIT Settles Antitrust Suit on Fixing of Student Aid, Reuters, CHI. TRIB., Dec.
23, 1993, § 1, at 14.
142. Andre v. Pace University, 618 N.Y.S.2d 975, 979 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1994).
Competitive pressures, however, continue to induce schools to make increasingly
costly promises. See, e.g., Rogers Worthington, Guarantees Are Big Lure on Campuses,
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 24, 1996, § 1, at 1 ("Across the country, . .. colleges are luring
freshmen with promises ofjobs and internships upon graduation, free tuition for
additional education and even monthly cash payment to grads who can't find ap-
propriate work in their chosen fields.").
[Vol. 41: p. 433
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol41/iss2/2
NONPROFIT SECTOR
Students have tried contract arguments before, nearly always
unsuccessfully, in order to wiggle out of repaying student loans. In-
deed, one of those students was Judge Dickerson himself. The Wall
Street Journal reports that his alma mater, Cornell, twenty years ago
sued him for $1,500 in unpaid student loans.143 He then argued
that his Comell education "had little or no value." He now claims
to be embarrassed by that case (which he lost), and denies that it
influenced his opinion in the Pace suit.Y4
III. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AS A REGULATORY FORCE
As economic forces obliterate the differences between non-
profit organizations and proprietary organizations, 145 an invisible
glue holds together existing arrangements, preventing the econo-
mist's beloved atomistic rational actors from redeploying resources.
This glue is the broad network of social institutions existing be-
tween electorate and representatives, donors and charities and ben-
eficiaries, shareholders and corporations. Institutions may include
laws, but they extend far more pervasively.1 46 Institutions are ritu-
als, common value patterns and culture. To the less normative soci-
ologist, they are social patterns and the common sense routines
that are taken for granted.14 7 As Douglass North observes,
"[i]nstitutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be so-
cially efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created
to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to devise
new rules."148
Modem society is a complex organism, and multiple social in-
stitutions present overlapping and often competing institutional
imperatives. The same people can, and do, perform several roles
that take place in different sectors. For example, a woman might
143. Edward Felsenthal, Avogadro's Number, You Say, Professor? I Don't Think So,
WALL ST. J., May 9, 1995, at Al.
144. Id.
145. For a discussion of this "organizational isomorphism," see Brody, Agents
Without Principals, supra note 3.
146. "Cultural controls can substitute for structural controls. When beliefs
are widely shared and categories and procedures taken for granted, it is less essen-
tial that they be formally encoded into the organizational structure." W. Richard
Scott, Unpacking Institutional Arguments, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note
48, at 164, 181. Certain illegal activities amount to institutions as well-gang be-
havior is highly institutionalized.
147. See Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio, Introduction to THE NEW INSTI-
TUTIONALISM, supra note 48, at 1 (discussing differences between "old institutional-
isms" and "new institutionalisms").
148. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND Eco-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE 16 (1990).
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work for a business corporation, serve on the board of the local arts
museum, live in a community with high local taxes and high levels
of public social services, send her child to a private primary school,
donate money to her Ivy League alma mater, and join a for-profit
health maintenance organization. She might suggest that the mu-
seum board adopt an advertising campaign like her proprietary em-
ployer uses. She should not be surprised, however, to discover
resistance, because a "pure" model of nonprofits spurns self-promo-
tion.149 Institutionalized social beliefs govern nonprofits more than
formal laws ever could.
A. Core Sectoral Constructs in a Complex Society
Society has become populated by a myriad of entities that seem
literally to have lives of their own. Along with the reification of or-
ganizations comes an expectation of how firms in different spheres
should behave. For example, business corporations should pay
their fair share of tax. Governmental agencies need to be re-
strained from trying to take our money and regulating our lives. At
the other extreme, we similarly view charities as somehow outside of
ourselves, but as entities "above" the mundane desires to compete
and prosper.
The various constructs of corporation, government agency and
charity, however, are only legal fictions.150 As a practical matter,
the boundaries of an organization cannot be precisely determina-
ble. That is, organizations cannot be separated from the human
beings who deal with them in their various capacities as sharehold-
149. Cf JoAnne Cleaver, Museum 's Dark Days, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus., Apr. 10, 1995,
at 1, 69 (quoting Barbara Meyerson, president of the Association of Youth Muse-
ums, who described museums' "fundamental shift from being inwardly focused to
being- market-driven" as "'getting out the front door and meeting your
neighbors"').
150. Justice Marshall provided the earliest American legal description of the
corporation:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only
in contemplation of law. Being a mere creature of law, it possesses only
those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either
expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.... Among the most im-
portant are immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed, individu-
ality; properties, by which a perpetual succession of many personals are
considered the same, and may act as a single individual .... It is chiefly
for the purpose of clothing bodies of men, in succession, with these quali-
ties and capacities, that corporations were invented, and are in use.
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). Marion
Fremont-Smith traces the English roots of ecclesiastical foundations back to 550,
with the revision of the Roman Law and the enactment of the Statutes ofJustinian.
MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 15 (1965).
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ers, voters or donors; as directors, elected and appointed officials,
trustees or staff; and as customers, citizens or beneficiaries.151 All
of these entities are associations, collective activities of human
beings.
As illustrated above, Americans' propensity to form associa-
tions requires a great variety of transacting and formal organiza-
tion. 52 Each of the traditional three sectors undeniably stakes out
discrete cores. 155 The public sector enjoys the power of compul-
sion in order to ensure the health, safety and well-being of the pub-
lic: The citizens consent to adhere to the laws, including tax laws,
enacted by chosen representatives. The proprietary sector retains
near-total autonomy over the private property it owns; in turn, cor-
porations act in the interests of their shareholders. The nonprofit
sector has both the public purpose of the governmental sector and
the autonomy of the proprietary sector, but nonprofit entities have
no owners.
154
There is no ideal sector for any particular collective activity. As
illustrated in Part II, history suggests that we delude ourselves in
trying to classify activities by sector. Many activities have, in various
times and in various places, been provided within various spheres of
conduct: the family, the church, the government, the proprietary
151. As an example of unclear boundaries, economists debate about who
bears the burden of the corporate income tax. Unagreed proportions are assigned
to shareholders (through lower dividends), employees (through lower wages), sup-
pliers (through lower prices paid), customers (through higher prices charged), or
even to all holders of capital. See U.S. TREAs. DEP'T, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVID-
UAL AND CORPORATE TAx SYSTEMS, supra note 15.
152. See Ronald L. Jepperson & John W. Meyer, The Public Order and the Con-
struction of Formal Organizations, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 48, at
204, 220. They observe:
First, in a system in which individuals are handed the loaded gun of legiti-
mated actorhood and legitimated interests, each individual must recog-
nize that others are similarly empowered. The first interest (and
collective obligation) of all in the Tocquevillean society is to attain con-
trol over everyone else .... An enormous amount of... organization is
constructed: religious organizations, courts and the criminal systems, lo-
cal government, parties, massive educational efforts, moral improvement
and self-control associations ....
Id.
153. See W. Richard Scott &John W. Meyer, The Organization of Societal Sectors:
Propositions and Early Evidence, in THE NEW INSTrrUTIONALISM, supra note 48, at 108.
154. "Ownership" is a complicated economic question. See Brody, Agents With-
out Principals, supra note 3, at 466 (noting that "economic theory fragments owner-
ship into three characteristics: the right to profits, the right to control and utilize
assets, and the right to alienate"). Here, I use the term "ownership" to mean the
right to receive profits and the right to transfer the interest.
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sector and private community organizations.155 Often the same
types of activities are produced simultaneously in more than one
sphere. For example, marriage counseling might be provided
within the family, neighbor-to-neighbor, by a pastor, by a private
therapist, by a governmental social service agency or by a nonprofit
entity. In choosing among sectors for service delivery, policy mak-
ers constantly argue over the relative importance of fairness and
efficiency, equality and diversity, and compulsory participation and
choice. 156
Here is a schematic summary of the core features of the three
sectors, as the public conceives them today:
Government Proprietary Nonprofit
Owners: None Shareholders None
Purpose: Public (broad) Commercial Public (narrow)
Coverage: Entitlement Market Discretionary
Governance: Representative Agents for hire Voluntary trustee
Funding: Taxes Profits/equity Donations
(compulsory) investment
Reputation: Ineffectually Opportunistic Trustworthy
egalitarian
Oversight: Electorate Shareholders Members/State
Subsidies: Tax exemption; None Tax exemption;
deduction for charitable
state income contribution
taxes deduction
At any given time, however, the sectors could have starkly dif-
ferent or overlapping characteristics. To complicate the inquiry,
distinctions are not always so clear as they initially appear. For
example-
1. When voting privileges were limited to free male land-
owners, the electorate closely matched those who
owned the (then agricultural) means of production.
155. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, SHIFrING INVOLVEMENTS: PRIVATE IN-
TEREST AND PUBLIC ACTION 8 (1982) (setting forth a theory to explain "the swings
from private concerns to public action and back").
156. Governments typically have broader, majoritarian, or last-resort goals,
whereas private enterprise, whether for-profit or nonprofit, can choose narrower
goals. See, e.g., Daniel C. Levy, A Comparison of Private and Public Educational Organi-
zations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 10, at 258, 270 (" [T] he private sector
may have an option, the public sector a responsibility. The public sector more
often tackles the difficult tasks, even the dirty work. In short, private-sector effec-
tiveness often depends on public-sector coverage.").
464 [Vol. 41: p. 433
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2. Either de jure or de facto, the board of directors of
both a for-profit corporation and of a nonprofit corpo-
ration are often self-perpetuating.
3. Taxes are not always so compulsory, nor contributions
so voluntary. Compare property taxes in a new
planned community with a religion that mandates tith-
ing, or a workplace solicitation for United Way, or even
the noblesse oblige of the moneyed classes. 157
4. Nonprofits often conduct business activities (the profits
from which are taxable if substantially unrelated to the
organization's exempt purpose). Are the activities of a
nonprofit hospital any less commercial than those of a
for-profit?
5. Real estate owned by governmental entities as well as by
nonprofit charities is exempt from local property tax.
Certain proprietary industries have, at times, enjoyed
effective property-tax or income-tax exemption.
In all of these cases, is the presence or absence of an obligation or
privilege based on legal form really so important?
B. Institutional Imperatives
The emerging democracies in the former Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe have been struggling to enact a legal structure hos-
pitable to charitable activity, yet one which polices abuses. Laws,
however, are empty words unless implemented in a context of
broader societal institutions. These formerly socialist countries first
need to develop notions of private property, personal responsibility,
cultures of trusteeship and the rule of law.' 58
157. See, e.g., Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit
Sector in a Three-Sector Economy, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS 21,
35 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986) [hereinafter THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT
INSTrrTUTIONS] (noting "voluntary organizations do employ 'coercive and compul-
sive powers,' just as do governments, although the penalties are social rather than
governmentally sanctioned fines or imprisonment"). Weisbrod also states that
"[w]hile pressures to 'donate' to the United Fund, Red Cross, Cancer Society, or
private colleges, are (sometimes) more subtle than the pressure to pay one's taxes,
the difference is one of degree, not of kind." Id.; see also THERESA ODENDAHL,
CHARITY BEGINS AT HOME 144 (1990) (discussing "card calling" pressure by Jewish
fundraising groups); Karen W. Arenson, Donations to a Jewish Philanthropy Ebb, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 27, 1995, at Al (noting that in past "many Jews considered their contri-
butions a kind of tax, referring to [the United Jewish Appeal-Federation] as the
Jewish I.R.S.").
158. They face similar problems developing a proprietary sector. Observed
economist Ronald Coase: "These ex-communist countries are advised to move to a
market economy, and their leaders wish to do so, but without the appropriate insti-
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In contrast, the United States has highly developed institutions
for nonprofit activity, but the American nonprofit sector today
seems infested with conflict, if not decay. Our nonprofit organiza-
tions find themselves caught between reduced government funding
and donor bum-out, yet face high demand for their services. De-
fending against charges of unfairly competing with the proprietary
sector, nonprofits increasingly compete even against each other.
The greed and hubris of some nonprofit executives expose chari-
ties to disgrace in the press, while even management attempts to act
in a more "business-like" manner attract criticism. It can often be
difficult to explain how a particular nonprofit organization, or even
industry, behaves differently from proprietary enterprises or gov-
ernmental agencies.
No one, however, can gainsay the economic strength of the
American nonprofit sector and the high level of American altruism.
Every year that brings America closer to the millennium brings
thousands of new charities,15 9 and donations rise each year.160
Moral, religious, political, economic and other forces drive people
to form nonprofits, to volunteer money or time to them, to work
for them, to seek assistance from them, to purchase their goods and
services, and to look to them for social or spiritual leadership.
A broad range of institutional forces dictate what nonprofits
are. While often constraining, institutions can also be liberating.161
To Douglass North, the "major role of institutions in a society is to
reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not necessarily effi-
cient) structure to human interaction." 162 Stability, of course, is not
permanence. Institutions should, and do, change.
Institutional beliefs can be good, bad or indifferent. A particu-
lar institution might or might not have normative content. Regard-
less, though, of whether it serves as a "highly rationalized myth" or
tutions no market economy of any significance is possible." R.H. Coase, ESSAYS ON
ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS, 6 (1994) (Nobel Prize Lecture, delivered Dec. 9,
1991).
159. The number of nonprofits, a state law designation, cannot be deter-
mined with precision. A total of 1.4 million nonprofit organizations was estimated
as of 1992, based on IRS and other data, and the number of tax-exempt charities
has grown 5% a year for the last eight years. VIRGINIA A. HODGKINSON ET AL., NON-
PROFIT ALMANAC: 1996-97: DIMENSIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT SECTOR 37 tbl.1.1, 219
(1996). Nearly three-fourths of all charities were founded since 1970. Id. at 15.
This figure, however, is partially a quirk of the data; not until the Tax Reform Act
of 1969 were charities required to obtain IRS recognition of their tax-exemption.
160. Id. at 5-6, 55-125.
161. Ronald L. Jepperson, Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism,
in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 48, at 143, 146.
162. NORTH, supra, note 148, at 6.
466 Vol. 41: p. 433
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merely reflects social habit, a particular set of social arrangements
tends to persist.163 Consider such common modem institutional
demands that nonprofits:
1. should not charge more than cost for a service or good,
or run a surplus from year-to-year (that is, should not
make a profit);
2. should not be run in a "business-like" way;
3. should not pay a market wage to employees;
4. should not compete;
5. should not take "tainted" money; and
6. can ignore laws that interfere with the charitable
mission.
This last belief can be the most dangerous. Nonprofits, because they
are nonprofit, sometimes assume that they need not be aware of legal
obligations. Some of them believe that the halo of nonprofit status
protects them, and perhaps mandates, that they rise above legal
impediments. 164
C. Institutional Dissonance
As illustrated at length in Part II, despite public expectations,
most nonprofits must and do compete: for funds, for labor, for le-
gitimacy and for survival.' 65 A nonprofit must accommodate the
institutional expectations of its industry, its donors, its volunteers,
its members, its beneficiaries, its clientele, its corporate sponsors, its
government granting agencies and the taxpaying public. Inevita-
bly, expectations conflict. 166 Nonprofit scholar Lester Salamon
163. Walter W. Powell, Expanding the Scope of Institutional Analysis, in THE NEW
INSTrrrIONAtISM, supra note 48, at 183, 194 ("Efforts at change are often resisted
because they threaten individuals' sense of security, increase the cost of informa-
tion processing, and disrupt routines.").
164. At the seemingly mundane level, a common problem is tax filings. See,
e.g., HALL, supra note 1, at 91. As a more substantive example, some church groups
believe that important religious tenets trump legal demands. See, e.g., Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding denial of federal tax ex-
emption to religious school engaging in racial discrimination, at odds with long-
standing federal policy). See also Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry v. United States,
470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973) (upholding consti-
tutionality of legislative ban on political activities by charities).
165. For examples of competition between nonprofits, see Part II, supra notes
10-144 and accompanying text.
166. Roger Friedland & Robert R. Alford, Bringing Society Back In: Symbols,
Practices, and Institutional Contradictions, in THE NEW INSTrruTiONALisM, supra note
48, at 232, 255 ("Thus the ancient Greek dramatists first represented individual
choice through role conflict, as in the case of Sophocles' Antigone who is torn
19961
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notes "a growing mismatch between the actual operation of the vol-
untary sector and popular conceptions of what this sector is sup-
posed to be like," opening up the sector to "cheap shots and
exposes" and political attacks.' 67
As a result, nonprofits and their constituents often find them-
selves gripped by "institutional dissonance." Like cognitive disso-
nance-the stress of simultaneously holding two opposing
views16 8-institutional dissonance requires the various players to ra-
tionalize what they do. These dilemmas are what make nonprofit
stories headline news.
For example, the Philip Morris company has for decades gen-
erously funded the arts, particularly in New York City where it is
headquartered.1 69 Suddenly, in the Fall of 1994, "writhing in dis-
may over strong anti-smoking legislation pending before the New
York City Council, Philip Morris executives telephoned arts institu-
tions that had benefited from their largess and asked them to put in
a good word."170 "This has put all my clients into a tailspin,"
moaned one arts consultant. 71 "They have been so shocked that
they don't know how to react.' 72 So powerful is the company that
no nonprofit would speak for attribution.17 3
Why the angst? Philip Morris has the legal right to lobby and
to make or withhold contributions.174 It has the right to ask the
supported arts groups for their help, but the charities have the
right to say no.'75 The city has the right to agree or disagree with
between familial duty to bury her brother and a political obligation not to bury a
traitor.").
167. Karen W. Arenson, Woeful '95 Leads U.S. Charities to Introspection, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 10, 1995, § 1, at 38.
168. See generally LIONEL FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNrrIVE DISSONANCE
(1957) (setting forth theory of cognitive dissonance).
169. Paul Goldberger, Philip Morris Calls in L O.U 's in the Arts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
5, 1994, at Al.
170. Id. Said a spokesman: "We will continue to give willingly and with great
enthusiasm to the arts: the question is not whether, but where. Right now, leaving
New York is not under active consideration, but the only permanent fixtures in
New York City are Grand Central Terminal and the Empire State Building." Id. at
C14.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. Moreover, such is the status of the company's arts program that
"Philip Morris money represents a kind of stamp of approval that can bring other
grants in its wake." Id.
174. See NancyJ. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, the
Nature of the Corporation, and the Social Construction of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 1,
19 (1995) (discussing proprietary sector's support of nonprofits).
175. A charityjeopardizes its tax exemption if it engages more than insubstan-
tially in lobbying. Under the Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury Depart-
[Vol. 41: p. 433
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the views expressed by the lobbyists, and potential donors and arts
patrons have the right to grant or withhold their patronage. What
will and "should" the arts group do? For example:
1. Would donors welcome corporate financial support as
sufficient to finance the needs of the charity, and thus
reduce their own donations?1 76 This "crowding out" ef-
fect has nothing to do with the morality or immorality
of the corporate sponsor's business.
2. Would donors and constituents such as ticket-buyers
lose respect for the arts groups because, in lobbying the
city government, they are furthering the commercial
interests of a corporate sponsor (again, independent of
the moral issue)? 177
3. Does the fact that this large corporate sponsor sells cig-
arettes make things worse?178 Anna Quindlen calls this:
"When Good People Take Bad Money."1 79
ment regulations, these contacts would likely be considered negligible. I.R.C.
§§ 501 (c) (3) & (h) (1996); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(h)-I through -3 (1996).
176. See Burton A. Abrams & Mark D. Schmitz, The Crowding-Out Effect of Gov-
ernment Transfers on Private Charitable Contributions, in THE ECONOMICS OF NON-
PROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 157, at 303, 304-05 (describing how government
grants have both substitution effect, where donors feel less need to give if someone
else does, and income effect, where the government's grantmaking increases taxes
and so reduces donors' ability to contribute); see also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Do
Government Grants to Charity Reduce Private Donations?, in THE ECONOMICS OF NON-
PROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 157, at 313 (discussing effect of government sup-
port on level of donations).
177. See, e.g., Douglas McLennan, Arts: W7en Art Cozies up to Business, Peril
Lurks, NEws TRIB., Oct. 6, 1994, at F2 (commenting that one Philip Morris-spon-
sored show seemed like "a corporate infomercial with art as the bait").
178. Said a spokeswoman for a New York dance company dependent on
Philip Morris sponsorship: "I say thank God for sinners: they're the only people to
support the arts." In this way, though, Philip Morris "reaches audiences unlikely to
pause before a Marlboro ad." Goldberger, supra note 169, at Al.
179. Anna Quindlen, The Tobacco Lobby: Good Causes, Bad Money, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 17, 1992, § 1, at 19 ("Organizations that work tirelessly to make life better,
freer and more fruitful pay for their works with profits on a product that kills
almost 440,000 Americans every year."). Ninety years ago, George Bernard Shaw
ridiculed the notion that we can separate clean money from tainted in the preface
to his play Major Barbara:
Some of [my critics] thought that the [Salvation] Army would not have
taken money from a distiller and a cannon founder: others thought it
should not have taken it: all assumed more or less definitely that it re-
duced itself to absurdity or hypocrisy by taking it....
[The Army] must take the money because it cannot exist without
money, and there is no other money to be had. Practically all the spare
money in the country consists of a mass of rent, interest, and profit, every
penny of which is bound up with crime, drink, prostitution, disease, and
all the evil fruits of poverty, as inextricably as with enterprise, wealth,
commercial probity, and national prosperity. The notion that you can
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4. Would donors and other constituents recognize the ex-
igencies facing the arts groups and forgive their having
to kowtow to an essential corporate sponsor?180
5. Or do arts patrons enjoy slumming with artists ex-
pected to live Bohemian, dissolute lives, so that alliance
with Philip Morris actually lends cachet to these arts
groups?181
The New York City arts groups cannot simultaneously hold to
opposing institutional constructs. In the end, they "should" reject
Philip Morris's demand if others reject it, perceiving public con-
demnation, and they "should" capitulate if others capitulate, per-
ceiving public sympathy. It's no wonder the nonprofits are in a
tailspin. Each arts group wants someone else to act first. Ulti-
mately, outcomes will depend on which institutional imperative cur-
rently has the upper hand.
We must recognize that similar conflicts operate in the public
and proprietary sectors.18 2 Politicians must balance various voter
expectations. When a corporation makes a grant to a controversial
cause, customers can vote with their dollar.183 No sector can es-
cape institutional forces and society's constant revision of them.
earmark certain coins as tainted is an unpractical individualist
superstition.
Bernard Shaw, Preface to MAJOR BARBARA 157 (Brentano's 1911).
180. Cf. Linda Winer, The Arts' Addiction to Philip Morris, NEWSDAY, Oct. 7,
1994, at B3 ("Philip Morris has been celebrated for its support of the avant-garde
and dance-fields that have increasingly been the most controversial and difficult
to fund .... [T] hese are the neediest groups, the most grateful groups, often the
most idealistic groups.").
181. According to Paul Goldberger, Philip Morris
often pays for lavish opening-night parties at which the Philip Morris ciga-
rettes at every table are the only obvious signs of corporate sponsorship.
(There was so much smoking at the opening of the Impressionism show
that the Temple of Dendur was enveloped in a cloud of smoke, some-
thing that will be prohibited if the legislation pending before the City
Council is passed.)
Goldberger, supra note 169, at L14.
182. See Steven Lee Myers, City Hall's Going Retail in Wholesale Fashion, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 1995, § 4, at 2 (stating municipalities sell advertising on police cars,
garbage trucks, and at playgrounds, and cities open official stores to sell such local
mementos as parking meters, street signs and manhole covers).
183. See, e.g., PC Pizza in the White House, WASHINGTONIAN MAG., Apr. 1993
(describing Clinton administration's change in pizza delivery companies). Late-
night meetings at the Reagan and Bush White Houses were fueled by pizza from
Domino's. Clinton staffers switched companies because Domino's owner Tom
Monaghan was active in the anti-abortion movement. Id.
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IV. PROPOSALS FOR LEGAL REFORM
What is the proper role for law in this picture? This Part exam-
ines proposals, some old and some recent, to reform various laws
affecting the nonprofit sector or subsectors. We begin with broad
proposals to shrink the nonprofit sector by limiting the size, lifes-
pan or permitted purposes of charities. Next, we consider calls for
uniformity in nonprofit law and for creating a central government
agency to supervise charities, essentially federalizing the sector. Fi-
nally, we focus on narrower proposals, such as those dealing with
mandated disclosure and expanded standing rights. 184
A. Broad Proposals for Reform
1. Restricting the Size of the Nonprofit Sector
Charities now form at a rate faster than proprietary busi-
nesses. 185 As suggested in Part II, there are segments of the non-
profit sector whose size and power one could only have dreamed of
in the early days of American philanthropy. 186 Some people un-
doubtedly seek nonprofit status for their activities out of, perhaps, a
mythic yearning to fit within the traditional notions of that sector.
For others, something more mundane is at stake, such as tax mini-
mization. In many cases, nonprofit formation occurs without con-
scious choice, merely based on the type of activities undertaken. In
any case, once assets reach the charitable subsector, particularly,
individuals have little ability to reclaim them.18 7 Should states thus
make it harder to shift assets into a private nonprofit sector?
a. English Development of Charitable Trust Law
A tension between private ownership and public control has
existed since the beginning of private property. By the time of
184. I save for another time proposals that go to the question of tax and other
subsidies for the nonprofit sector.
185. HODGKINSON ET AL., supra note 159, at 25 (reporting rate of growth of
other nonprofits was slower than rate of business formation); see also Dan Skelly,
Sources of IRS Data on Nonprofits and Charitable Giving (May 22, 1992), reprinted in 5
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 973 (June 1992). IRS data show that gross domestic prod-
uct, adjusted for inflation, increased by 50% from 1974 to 1990. Id. During the
same period, inflation-adjusted revenue of private foundations grew by 124%. Id.
Total revenue of publicly supported charities increased by 52% in real terms. Id.
Since 1992, growth in the charitable sector has declined. HODGKINSON ET AL.,
supra note 159, at 3.
186. For a discussion of the growth of the nonprofit sector, see Part II, supra
notes 10-144 and accompanying text.
187. Mutual nonprofits, by contrast, can generally distribute their assets to
their members on dissolution.
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Henry VIII, church ownership of land reached an estimated one-
third to one-half of private landholdings. This situation evolved de-
spite a provision in the Magna Carta, added by Henry III in 1225,
that forbade "freemen to alienate 'so much of his land as will
render the residue insufficient to secure the service due to his
Lord." ' 188 William Shakespeare found the dispute between the
crown and church so dramatic that he opened his play Henry Vwith
a scheme cooked up by the Archbishop of Canterbury. a89 The
clergy goaded young Henry V into invading France, as a distraction
from considering a bill to strip the Church of "all the temporal
lands which men devout/By testament have given to the
Church."1 90 "'Twould drink the cup and all," Canterbury de-
clares. 191 Henry VIII secularized charity by dissolving the monas-
teries and "prohibiting the creation of trusts for religious uses of
more than twenty years." 192
Tudor England struggled to develop a coherent law privileging
private ownership of property at a time when most property con-
sisted of land.193 The law of primogeniture mandated that title in
land must pass to the oldest son; only personal property could pass
otherwise by testamentary disposition.' 94 Attempts to circumvent
this restriction led property owners to grant "uses" in the land. 95
By the time of Henry V, most of the land in England was held in
use. 196 This proliferation prompted Parliament to adopt two laws:
the Statute of Uses in 1535, under Henry VIII, and the Statute of
Charitable Uses in 1601, under Elizabeth 1. 19 7
The Statute of Uses gave us the Rule Against Perpetuities,
which essentially requires that outright ownership of property must
188. FREMONT-SMrrH, supra note 150, at 17 (quoting Magna Carta). In this
quote, "Lord" obviously refers to the earthly sovereign.
189. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE LIFE OF KING HENRY THE FIFrH act 1, scene 1
(Yale Univ. Press 1955).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. FREMONT-SMrrH, supra note 150, at 23. Compare this term with the early
American business corporation. State charters in the early nineteenth century
often contained duration limits, commonly 20 years. See, e.g., HARTZ, supra note
16, at 238-40 (ascribing this trend, and other legislative reservation clauses, to
Supreme Court's decision in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819)).
193. See FREMONT-SMrrH, supra note 150, at 26; Brody, Charitable Endow-
ments, supra note 21, at 28-39.
194. FREMONT-SMrrH, supra note 150, at 26.
195. Id.
196. See id. at 20.
197. Id.
[Vol. 41: p. 433
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vest at least every hundred years,198 thus preventing a testator from
dictating beneficial enjoyment long after his death. Under these
Dead Hand rules, a devise of property into a trust fails if the trust
has no ascertainable beneficiaries. 199 The sine qua non of a charity,
however, is that its beneficiaries be of a broad enough class that
they are unknowable.200 Accordingly, the Statute of Charitable
Uses created an exception from the Dead Hand rules for bequests
to charitable trusts.2 0 1
The list of purposes contained in the preamble to the Statute
of Charitable Uses included such activities as the founding of hospi-
tals and prisons, and relief for the poor. Over the years, trusts were
upheld for a range of charitable purposes, some silly. As Lewis
Simes put it: "By this device, the vanity of the dead capitalist may
shape the use of property forever."20 2 No donor can be so far-
sighted as to see what society will need hundreds of years into the
future. Accordingly, under the cy pres doctrine, the state retains the
power to reform the purposes of a charitable trust whose intended
purposes can no longer be carried out.20 3 The state's power to dis-
regard or reform the directions of the donor, however, is usually
applied as minimally as possible. 20 4
198. Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HAST. LJ. 1111, 1114 & n.8
(1993).
199. Id.
200. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 150, at 20.
201. Specifically, the Elizabethan law permitted trusts to be formed for the
following purposes:
[T]o erect, found, and establish, one or more hospitals, maison de Dieu,
abiding places, or house of corrections .... as well as for the finding,
sustenation, and relief of the maimed, poor, needy or impotent people,
as to set the poor to work, to have continuance forever, and from time to
time place therein such head and members, and such number of poor as
to him, his heirs and assigns should seem convenient.
Statute of Charitable Uses, 39 Eliz. I, ch. 5 (1597) (Eng.), as reprinted in Fishman,
supra note 18, at 630 n.65. The subsequent Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz. I,
ch. 4 (1601) (Eng.), "provided machinery for the enforcement of charitable
trusts." Fishman, supra note 18, at 621 & n.19 ("The new procedure was little em-
ployed after a period of time and, the importance of the law of charitable trusts lies
in the preamble of the statute, which contains an enumeration of charitable pur-
poses."); see also FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 150, at 23-27.
202. LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 111 (1955).
203. The charitable exception also abrogates the general policy against ina-
lienability. In modern times, this rarely presents a problem, because most assets
held in charitable trusts are liquid. Difficulties might arise for real property held
by a trust (for example, a school, hospital or museum) dedicated to the specified
use in perpetuity.
204. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, THE LAW or TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 433, at
95 (2d ed. 1991) (noting that term cy pres derives from cy pres comme possible, the
French for "as near as possible"); Atkinson, supra note 198, at 118.
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b. The American Experience
As in England, charity law developed in the United States
largely through suits instigated by disappointed heirs seeking to de-
feat charitable bequests.20 5 State trust law-including the cy pres
doctrine-governs transfers into charitable trusts.2 06 American
charitable trust law also gives broad deference to the settlor's wishes
and generally accepts long periods of dormancy and accumulation
of income for a charitable purpose.20 7 Courts upheld the accumu-
lation provisions in Benjamin Franklin's bequest to a trust for loans
to "young married artificers." Over the next 150 years, however, its
earnest trustees repeatedly sought judicial cy pres reform of the
trust, as the dollar caps proved inadequate, the eligibility restric-
205. See, e.g., Ould v. Washington Hosp. for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303 (1877)
(considering challenge by heirs that bequest was not charitable). For a discussion
of the development of charity law in England, see GEORGE DuKE, CHARTABLE USES
(1637). See also Fishman, supra note 18, at 626 ("[In the] ongoing anti-charity-anti-
clerical atmosphere of the period[, even] as wise a jurist as Justice Joseph Story
supported mortmain statutes to check clerical power and believed that charities,
religious or otherwise, trampled individual rights by depriving future heirs of prop-
erty to which they were entitled.").
206. After the American Revolution, some states repealed English statutes,
including the Statute of Charitable Uses; the Supreme Court declared invalid char-
itable trusts in those states that failed to adopt replacement statutes. Trustees of
Philadelphia Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs, 17 U.S. 1, 38-39 (1819). But see Vidal v.
Mayor, Alderman and Citizens of Philadelphia, 43 U.S. 127 (1844) (effectively re-
pealing Hart, after discovery of evidence that charitable trusts existed at common
law, i.e., without regard to English statutes). See also Fishman, supra note 18, at 627
n.49 ("Stephen Girard should be considered the patron saint of American lawyers,
for his will has generated so much litigation that he possibly has helped more
attorneys than orphans.").
The spectacular failure of Samuel J. Tilden's multi-million dollar bequest to
fund a free public library in New York City shocked the public. See Tilden v.
Green, 28 N.E. 880 (N.Y. 1891) (holding charitable testamentary trust invalid due
to lack of certainty of beneficiary). New York quickly adopted the Tilden Act, 1893
N.Y. Laws 701, which provided that gifts for charitable uses could not be "deemed
invalid by reason of the indefiniteness or uncertainty of" their beneficiaries.
FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 150, at 39; Fishman, supra note 18, at 628 n.57.
207. See EDITH FISCH ET AL., CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS § 119
(1974) (stating charitable trust may not accumulate all income in perpetuity).
Whether or not states have legislated limits on accumulations, courts exercise eq-
uity powers to require that accumulations be reasonable in light of the charitable
purpose and public policy. For example, the will in In reJames'Estate, 199 A.2d 275
(Pa. 1964), established a trust for Masonic homes, with much of the income to be
accumulated until termination and vesting in the Masons after 400 years. Id. at
275-76. The court stated: "We are reluctant to ascribe to testator the paramount
desire merely to turn an approximately $50,000 trust fund into a final gift of al-
most $15,000,000 at the expense of immediate social needs." Id. at 279. In making
the income available to the beneficiary currently, the court observed: "Shifting
and advanced social concepts, programs and concerns emphasize the hazards of
seeking to correct or alleviate social problems so distantly removed from testator's
generation." Id. at 280.
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tions too limiting and, finally, the benefited trade fell to advancing
technology.208
In general, however, American charity law has come to look
quite different from English charity law because most American
charities take the corporate form.209 A bequest to a charitable cor-
poration does not invoke the Rule Against Perpetuities, because
ownership of the property vests outright in the corporation. Nor,
under the modem view, does the state's cy pres power reach non-
profit corporations, although charities are bound by restrictions im-
posed on donations.2 10 Nonprofit corporation law cedes a great
deal of autonomy to founders and directors of charitable corpora-
tions, a level of discretion that trustees can match only if granted by
the founder in the settlement instrument.2 11
Proposals to restrict the size of the charitable sector surface
occasionally, especially during times of social uncertainty. Reform-
ers have generally concentrated on a subset of charities, known as
foundations, that are viewed as uniquely susceptible to control by a
single family. In the 1912 presidential race, Theodore Roosevelt
opposed federal charters for foundations because "no amount of
charity in spending such fortunes [as John D. Rockefeller's] can
compensate in any way for the misconduct in acquiring them."
212
208. SIMES, supra note 202, at 141-53.
209. Marion Fremont-Smith attributes the dominance of the nonprofit corpo-
ration form in the United States to the continued skittishness of donors with the
trust form after Hart, as well as to the rise of the business corporation. FREMor-
SMITH, supra note 150, at 40. It might also be that American philanthropists chose
the corporate form because of eighteenth-century married women's property actsl
Treudley, supra note 12, at 135. Truedley notes that: "Most societies of any impor-
tance were incorporated so that they might hold property. They had the same
elected officers and tended to choose the treasurer from among the unmarried
women to avoid any legal complications arising from a husband's right to control
money placed in his wife's hands." Id.
210. New York is one state that imposes "quasi-cy pres principles" to a charita-
ble corporation that wants to modify the purposes clause of its articles of incorpo-
ration. Alco Gravure, Inc. v. Knapp Found., 479 N.E.2d 752, 757 & n.7 (N.Y.
1985); cf REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 10.02 & 10.30 (1987) (granting
directors in nonmembership corporation authority to amend articles of incorpora-
tion unless articles require approval of another specified person or persons).
211. See generally EVELYN BRODY, THE LIMITs OF CHARITY FIDUCIARY LAW (Yale
Univ. Program on Non-Profit Organizations, Working Paper, forthcoming 1997)
(draft June 3, 1996).
212. HALL, supra note 1, at 48. In 1906, John D. Rockefeller unsuccessfully
sought a federal charter for his proposed $100 million foundation. Id. at 189-90.
Rockefeller wanted public accountability for the foundation through an ex officio
board comprising the President of the United States, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives, and the presidents of several elite universities. Id. Defeated, Rockefel-
ler then easily obtained a state charter from New York, but he abandoned the
public features of the charter because the "parochialism [of New York officials]
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That same year, Congress created a Commission on Industrial Rela-
tions, whose 1916 final report "charged that the concentration of
wealth in the large foundations, such as the Carnegie and the Rock-
efeller, was being used by industrial magnates to gain control of the
universities and, thereby, the social and educational side of Ameri-
can life."2 13 The Commission recommended "requiring federal
charters for the incorporation of all nonprofit organizations with
more than one function and funds of more than $1 million, limita-
tion on the size, income, and life of the foundations, as well as the
creation of rigid supervisory procedures. 2 1 4
Subsequent congressional investigations focused on tax laws,
the main area of federal jurisdiction over nonprofits. When Henry
Ford died in 1947, he left the voting stock in Ford Motor Company
to his family and the nonvoting stock to the Ford Foundation.2 15
Politicians and journalists worried that a tax-sensitive public would
hardly accept as charitable the use of a foundation to avoid taxes
and concentrate wealth while promoting a liberal policy agenda.21 6
In 1952, as the nation was caught up in the Red Scare, a congres-
sional committee probed foundations and other nonprofits "espe-
cially to determine which such foundations and organizations are
using their resources for un-American and subversive activities or
for purposes not in the interest or tradition of the United States."217
The foundations, however, responded so persuasively that the com-
mittee's final report urged that even greater contributions be made
to these worthwhile entities.218 Despite this, a disappointed con-
gressman, B. Carroll Reece, pressed on. Although he failed to
prove organized philanthropy guilty of supporting communism, he
again exposed the way vast private wealth could be preserved in
would be unsuited to an organization that proposed to operate 'for the benefit of
mankind' on a national and international basis." Id.
213. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 150, at 51 (citing COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: FINAL REPORT AND TESTIMONY, S. Doc. No. 64-
415 (1916)).
214. COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: FINAL RE-
PORT AND TESTIMONY, S. Doc. No. 64-415, at 85.
215. HALL, supra note 1, at 64 (stating foundation promptly sold stock at im-
mense profit).
216. Id. Professor Hall identifies Howard Hughes as an example of a leading
right-winger who made adroit use of a nonprofit (and tax-exempt) foundation. Id.
at 290 n.183. See generally DONALD L. BARTLETr AND JAMES B. STEELE, EMPIRE: THE
LIFE, LEGEND, AND MADNESS OF HowARD HUGHES (1979) (chronicling life of re-
cluse industrialist Howard Hughes).
217. HALL, supra note 1, at 67-68, 291 n.191 (quoting H. REs. 561, in Hearings
Before the Select Comm. to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Orgs., 82d
Cong. 1 (1952)).
218. Id. at 68.
[Vol. 41: p. 433476
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charities, while being administered by donors and professional
managers (the "philanthropoids") to influence research, education
and the media. 219
During the 1960s Representative Wright Patman called for
widespread reform. His plan included suspending the creation of
tax-exempt foundations; limiting the life of foundations to twenty-
five years; imposing a 20% tax on foundation income; prohibiting
foundations from borrowing or lending money; and requiring that
all contributions and capital gains be spent currently.220 The U.S.
Treasury Department issued a report in 1965, far more mild but
still radical, that recommended such major legislative changes as
prohibiting business dealings between donors and foundations; lim-
iting foundation ownership of voting control of businesses; restrict-
ing the deductibility of donor-controlled gifts; and regulating the
number of years donors and their families could serve on governing
boards.221 Many of the Treasury's proposals found their way into
the Tax Reform Act of 1969, along with restrictions on political ac-
tivities.22 2 Except for the limits on political activities, however,
these limitations apply only to "private foundations," and not to
universities, hospitals or "publicly-supported charities."
2. Limiting Permitted Purposes
Many state nonprofit laws (as well as the Internal Revenue
Code) separate nonprofits into two general categories, the mutual
nonprofit and the charity.22 3 Typically, the mutual nonprofit is a
219. Id. at 69.
220. Id. at 71.
221. Id.; see also TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT ON PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS,
PRINTED FOR USE OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 89TH CONG., 1ST
SESS. (Comm. Print 1965)).
222. See Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 488 (1969) (adding Chapter 42A to Inter-
nal Revenue Code). The Tax Reform Act of 1969 dealt particularly strong blows to
the family-controlled private foundation. See I.R.C. §§ 4943, 4946 (1996) (impos-
ing taxes on excess business holdings by private foundations).
223. An example is the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act of 1987,
with its separate regimes for "public purpose" corporations, "mutual benefit" cor-
porations and religious corporations. This triumvirate was modeled on Califor-
nia's law, although the model act treats the three classes together except where
necessary. See Michael C. Hone, Aristotle and Lyndon BainesJohnson: Thirteen Ways of
Looking at Blackbirds and Nonprofit Corporations-The American Bar Association's Re-
vised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 751, 762 (1989). Pro-
fessor Hone was the reporter for both the California act and the Revised Model
Act.
The Revised Model Act has been adopted, in whole or in part, in Arkansas,
Indiana, Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Wash-
ington and Wyoming. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-210 (Michie 1995); IND. CODE
ANN. § 23-17-1-1 (Michie 1996); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-11-101 (1995); MONT. CODE
1996]
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group of people or organizations banded together to serve the
members' common interests. For workers, think of labor unions;
for businesses, think of trade associations and boards of trade; in a
social setting, think of social clubs with their private dining facilities
and golf courses. By contrast, charities are outward-looking, com-
munity-based or community-oriented organizations. Churches, uni-
versities and nonprofit hospitals are classic examples of charities.
A nonprofit corporation need not necessarily distinguish itself
from a for-profit corporation by the statement of purposes set forth
in its articles of incorporation. Modem nonprofit laws typically per-
mit nonprofits to be formed for any lawful purpose.224 As a sepa-
rate matter, however, a charity qualifies for federal income tax
exemption only if it has a specified public purpose, rather than a
private purpose.2 25 Most charities adopt limited purpose language
in their articles of incorporation in order to obtain tax exemption.
While some might believe that "there oughta be a law" gov-
eming many areas of nonprofit behavior, no law requires charities
to serve only the poor,22 6 prohibits nonprofits from engaging in
business activities 227 or bars nonprofits from paying high salaries. 228
ANN. § 35-2-113 (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-1-01 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-
31-101 (Law. Co-op. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-Sl-101 (1996); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 24.03.005 (1995); Wyo. STAT. ANN § 17-19-101 (Michie 1996). Georgia and Ohio
recently revised their nonprofit corporation laws, but explicitly rejected the Re-
vised Model Act. New York has four categories of nonprofits. N.Y. NoT-FOR-
PROFIT Cor. LAw ch. 35, § 201(b) (McKinney 1996).
224. See Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA.
L. REv. 497, 509-38 (1981) [hereinafter Hansmann, Reforming Law] (discussing
"the varying approaches taken in the state statutes toward the purposes for which
nonprofit corporations may be formed").
225. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1996); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii)
(1996) (mandating that charity must serve public interest rather than private inter-
ests of "designated individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the organ-
ization, or persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests").
Charity status offers donors tax deductibility for charitable contributions. I.R.C.
§ 170 (1996).
226. Cf Mark Pauly & Michael Redisch, The Not-for-Profit Hospital as a Physi-
cians' Cooperative, 63 Am. ECON. REv. 87, 98 n.16 (1973). The authors state:
It is sometimes alleged that these firms have attained a nonprofit status so
that they may better provide services to the poor. However, the recent
experience in this country is for the poor to receive health services from
government operated hospitals, to receive education in government op-
erated institutions, and not to partake at all of the output of symphony
orchestras, theatre groups, or private universities,
Id.
227. But if the business is "unrelated" to the exempt purpose of the non-
profit, it might be subject to income tax. I.R.C. §§ 501(b) & 511 through 515
(1996).
228. The public also carries expectations of appropriate salaries in nonchari-
table pursuits. See, e.g., Roger Angell, Hardball, NEW YORKER, Oct. 17, 1994, at 65,
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In fact, only a small percentage of nonprofits devote themselves to
relief of the poor.229 Donations make up less than thirty percent of
the sector's total receipts.230 Volunteers represent only thirty-six
percent of total charity labor.231
Although nonprofits may legally conduct commercial activities,
these transactions have raised questions about their tax exemption,
in whole or in part. In the mid-1980s, small businesses lobbied
Congress to reign in the "unfair competition" resulting from non-
profits' expansion into commercial enterprises, free of the income
taxes imposed on the proprietary sector. In the face of hard lobby-
ing from the charitable sector, however, proposals for reform could
not even make their way out of a subcommittee of the House Ways
and Means Committee.23 2 In 1991, the Ways and Means Commit-
tee held hearings on whether nonprofit hospitals should be re-
quired, as a condition of their tax-exempt status, to provide
specified levels of care to indigents.233 Again, the proposals
died.2 34 While no one has proposed to deny opera companies tax-
exempt status, several Republicans have proposed tax credits for
68 ("'Because it's baseball, the players shouldn't be getting so much,' I heard it
declared not long ago; this came from a fortyish lawyer at a social gathering, but it
had an oracular tone to it-a mysterious message echoing out of a cave.").
229. For an example of a study reflecting this conclusion, see Kirsten A.
Gronbjerg, Poverty and Nonprofit Organization Behavior, 64 Soc. SERV. REv. 208, 217,
228-29 (1990). Moreover, this study focuses on human service nonprofits other
than hospitals, and excludes other broader-based-if not elitist-arts, cultural, ed-
ucational and research organizations. Id. at 239 n.1.
230. According to tax filings (which are not required of churches or small
charities), contributions as a percentage of charitable revenues fell from 31.6% in
1975 to 19.9% in 1990 and fell further to 17.7% in 1991. Including churches and
small charities would obviously increase these percentages. See Tax-Exempt Organi-
zations: Additional Information on Activities and IRS Oversight, GAO's Testimony at
House Government Reform and Oversight Panel Hearing on Nonprofit Advocacy Before the
Subcomm. on Nat'l Econ. Growth, Natural Resources, and Reg. Affairs, Comm. on Gov't
Reform and Oversight, 102d Cong. 1 (1995) (statement of Natwar M. Ghandi, Assoc.
Dir. for Tax Policy and Admin. Issues, Gen. Gov't Div., Gen. Acc'g Office), available
in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 95 TNT 129-70.
231. HODGKINSON ET AL., supra note 159, at 13, 28-30, 134-35.
232. See Letter from Kenneth W. Gideon, Ass't Sec. Treas. (Tax Policy), to
Dan Rostenkowski, Chair H. Ways & Means Comm., and toJJ. Pickle, Chair Over-
sight Subcomm. H. Ways & Means Comm. (May 23, 1991), available in LEXIS,
Fedtax Library, TNT File, 91 TNT 152-1 ("That review and those consultations
developed no set of proposals which would significantly improve tax administra-
tion with respect to lthe unrelated business income tax] and command a broad
base of support. Accordingly, we make no specific proposals to the Committee.").
233. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 102D CONG., 1ST SESS., PROPOSALS AND
ISSUES RELATING TO THE TAX EXEMPT STATUS OF NoT-FOR-PROFIT HoSPITALs IN-
CLUDING DESCRIPTIONS OF H.R. 1374 AND H.R. 790, at 13-22 (Comm. Print 1991).
234. Id. Activity at the state level, however, has been more successful; a few
jurisdictions repealed the property tax exemption of nonprofit hospitals failing to
provide sufficient charity care.
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donations only to anti-poverty charities.23 5 Moreover, precedents
exist for removing subsidies to a nonprofit category. In 1951, Con-
gress repealed the tax exemption of mutual savings and loan as-
sociations.2 36 In 1986, Congress repealed the tax exemption of
Blue Cross and Blue Shield.23 7
B. A New Federalism?
1. Uniform Law of Charity
Before the states adopted standardized corporation laws, each
incorporation was a matter of negotiation between the state legisla-
ture and the corporation.23 8 This case-by-case approval mechanism
sounds quaint to our ears, a harkening back to an era of quill pens
and sealing wax. Nonprofit corporations can now form under the
state nonprofit corporation act just as easily as for-profit corpora-
tions do under the state business corporation act.2 39
Nonprofit corporation laws, like business corporation laws,
provide rules of internal governance and state regulation.2 40 A
235. For a discussion of the tax credit proposal by 1996 Republican presiden-
tial nominee Bob Dole and others, see supra notes 13 and 61 and accompanying
text. A large volume of literature on altruism exists. See, e.g., Kenneth Arrow, Gifts
and Exchanges, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY AND ECONOMIC THEORY 13 (Edmund S.
Phelps ed., 1975); Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV.
501 (1990). Peter Dobkin Hall deplores the assumption that "tax avoidance has
been a major incentive for individual and corporate philanthropy." HALL, supra
note 1, at 107-08; cf. William C. Randolph, Dynamic Income, Progressive Taxes, and the
Timing of Charitable Contributions, 103 J. POL. ECON. 709 (1995).
236. Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-183, § 313, 65 Stat. 452 (1951),
repealing Int. Rev. Code of 1939, as amended §§ 101 (2) (exemption from tax of mu-
tual savings banks) & 101(4) (exemption from tax of building and loan associa-
tions and cooperative banks); see CONF. COMM. REP., REVENUE AcT OF 1951, H.R.
REP. No. 82-1213 (1951), reprinted in 1951-2 Cum. Bull. 622, 627.
237. See I.R.C. § 501 (m) (1996) (certain organizations providing commercial-
type insurance not exempt from tax); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514,
§ 1012(c) (3), 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (providing special rules for existing Blue Cross
or Blue Shield organizations).
238. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 129-30 (1932). The corporate "charter provided with ex-
treme care the exact property which the corporation could own and the maximum
amount thereof; ... the precise methods by which its business transactions could
be carried on; and a very careful (if somewhat loosely drawn) indication of the line
of its future development." Id. at 130 n.4. Charters also specified rules about the
board of directors; for example, in Pennsylvania, in order to prevent a concentra-
tion of corporate power, often charters required bank directors to rotate and
barred public officials from bank directorships. HARTZ, supra note 16, at 254-55.
239. Amazingly, though, some individualized negotiation occurs today for
many of the thousands of new nonprofit organizations seeking recognition each
year from the IRS as section 501(c) (3) charities.
240. See Ira Mark Ellman, Another Theory of Nonprofit Corporations, 80 MICH. L.
REv. 999, 1001-02 (1982) (noting that "corporation code deals primarily with rules
[Vol. 41: p. 433
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charity must also comply with the various laws of every state (and
sometimes subdivisions) in which it conducts activities or solicits
funds. Finally, most charities seek recognition of federal income
tax exemption, so, in practice, the requirements of the Internal
Revenue Code provide a lowest common denominator of con-
straints and obligations.2 41
Obviously a single law would be easier to follow and enforce.
Commentators often lament the absence of a uniform body of char-
ity law. A close approximation of uniformity can be achieved
through state adoption of uniform laws or multistate cooperation,
but such an effort takes time and political persuasion.
2. State (or Federal) Charity Board
Oversight of nonprofits generally lodges with the state attorney
general.2 42 Once a nonprofit corporation comes into being, its ob-
ligations to the state often consist of no more than an annual filing
attesting to its continued existence, and setting forth its address
and the names and addresses of its directors.243 The registration
and reporting system plays a minor role in identifying or initiating
attorney general action. Instead, the overwhelming majority of
state actions start with complaints from dissenting or disappointed
board members, employees and beneficiaries.2 44
In 1960, Kenneth Karst lamented the pervasively poor attorney
general enforcement and called for a new agency at the state level
of internal governance"); Lizabeth A. Moody, The Who, What, and How of the Revised
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, 16 N. Ky. L. REv. 251, 263-65 (1988) (discussing
drafting of Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act).
241. Many states' nonprofit corporation rules and the Revised Model Non-
profit Corporation Act refer to the Internal Revenue Code for such rules as the
definition of prohibited transactions or the test for a proper distribution of assets
on dissolution. See, e.g., Howard L. Oleck, Mixtures of Profit and Nonprofit Corpora-
tion Purposes and Operations, 16 N. Ky. L. REv. 225, 239 (1988) (noting that "[m] any
state corporation law statutes now contain at least one specific section that refers to
the [IRS] Code's rules as the definition of 'prohibited transactions' for nonprofit
organizations").
242. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled
State Responsibility, 73 HARv. L. REV. 433, 449-60 (1960) (discussing enforcement by
attorney general). See generally FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 150, ch. VI (Agencies
for State Supervision), at 194-232, & ch. VII (The Role of Attorney General), at
233-71; Office of the Ohio Attorney General, The Status of State Regulation of Charita-
ble Trusts, Foundation, and Solicitations, in 5 FILER COMM'N RES. PAPERS, supra note
41, at 2705.
243. Usually charities must also notify the attorney general when they desire
to sell substantially all of their assets, merge or liquidate.
244. HARRIET BoGRAD, THE ROLE OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL IN RELATION
TO TROUBLED NONPROFITS (Yale Univ. Program on Non-Profit Organizations,
Working Paper No. 206, Aug. 1994).
1996]
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to regulate and advise charities, as well as to prevent duplication
among charitable functions and between charitable and govern-
mental functions. 245 In 1977, the Treasury Department, under the
direction of John H. Filer, published the first comprehensive, mul-
tidisciplinary survey of the nonprofit sector in the form of a five-
volume set of research papers. Among numerous other recommen-
dations, which largely supported expansion of the charitable sector,
the Filer Commission advocated a permanent national supervisory
agency. 246 Proponents envisioned a body that would educate the
charitable sector as much as regulate it.247 The Carter administra-
tion, however, was not interested.2 48
Since that time, enforcement by the attorneys general has gen-
erally not improved. In the 1980s, Professor Henry Hansmann ob-
served: "Although the prohibition on distribution of profits is more
or less clearly embodied in the nonprofit corporation law of nearly
all the states, most states in fact make little or no effort to enforce
this prohibition. ''2 49 Perceiving weak state enforcement, some call
for increased IRS action against tax-exempt organizations, and
tighter rules to reach greater numbers and a wider variety of cases
of insider benefit.
3. Conforming Fiduciary Standards
Both charitable trustees and directors of nonprofit corpora-
tions owe their entity the twin fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.
The fiduciary law, however, for these two legal forms has developed
along different tracks. Charitable trust law tends to resemble the
law of private trusts, while nonprofit corporation law tends to re-
semble the law of business corporations. 250
245. Karst, supra note 242, at 476-83 (highlighting advantages of consolidat-
ing state functions and avoiding political role of attorney general).
246. Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, Commentary on
Commission Recommendation, in 1 FILER COMM'N RES. PAPERS, supra note 41, at 38.
247. See, e.g., David Ginsburg et al., Federal Oversight of Private Philanthropy, in 5
FILER COMM'N RES. PAPERS, supra note 41, at 2575, 2640-44; Donald R. Spuehler,
The System for Regulation and Assistance of Charity in England and Wales, with Recom-
mendations on the Establishment of a National Commission on Philanthropy in the United
States, in 5 FILER COMM'N RES. PAPERS, supra note 41, at 3045; Adam Yarmolinsky &
Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Preserving the Private Voluntary Sector: A Proposal for a Pub-
lic Advisory Commission on Philanthropy, in 5 FILER COMM'N RES. PAPERS, supra note
41, at 2857.
248. HALL, supra note 1, at 78.
249. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 873
(1980) [hereinafter Hansmann, Role of Nonprofit Enterprise].
250. For a discussion of fiduciary law, see Brody, Fiduciary Law, supra note 211,
at 6-8.
[Vol. 41: p. 433
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The state's supervisory impotence probably explains an impor-
tant blunt provision of trust law. Strict duty of loyalty rules prevent
a trustee from engaging in self-dealing transactions, even when fair
(except for reasonable compensation).251 For example, a trustee
may not purchase stock owned by the trust, regardless of whether
the trustee pays fair market value-or even more. Effectively, be-
cause the government cannot adequately police the fairness of
these transactions, they may not take place at all. Congress imposes
similar "prohibited-transactions" restrictions on private founda-
tions, whether in trust or corporate form.2 52
By contrast, state laws governing nonprofit corporations (and
tax laws governing publicly-supported charities) only bar the insid-
ers from receiving distributions of the organization's profits. Mod-
em nonprofit statutes apply the liberal business corporation rules
to directors. 253 Breaches of the duty of loyalty occur when, for ex-
ample, directors engage in self-dealing transactions that have not
been ratified by disinterested directors or that are unfair to the cor-
poration. Henry Hansmann would conform the trust and corpo-
rate standards for charity fiduciaries by subjecting charitable
corporation directors to the charitable trustee self-dealing
prohibitions. 254
At the federal level, Congress recently enacted private-founda-
tion-like excise taxes for disqualified persons (generally, insiders)
who engage in "excess benefit transactions" with their publicly-sup-
251. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) LAW OF TRUSTS § 170 (1957) (discussing duty of
loyalty). The trust settlor may waive these restrictions and commonly does.
252. I.R.C. § 4941 (1996) (taxes on self-dealing).
253. The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act applies a slightly stricter
set of rules to self-dealing and conflicts of interest of public-benefit corporation
directors. Introduction to REv. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT xxxvi-xxxvii (1987); see
Deborah A. DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactions in Nonprofit Corporations, 59 BROOK. L.
REv. 131, 137-39 (1993) (stating Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act applies
arm's-length standard even to insider self-dealing). Professor Oleck faulted the
ABA for referring the revision of the model act to its Section on Corporation,
Banking, and Business Law, "because that section is the wrong one for planning
law for altruistic, voluntaristic, pro bono organizations-organizations whose pur-
poses are supposed to be selfless, spiritual, and in the public service." Oleck, supra
note 241, at 243-44.
254. See Hansmann, Reforming Law, supra note 224, at 569-73 (arguing that
duty of loyalty standard that applies to charitable trustees be extended to charita-
ble corporation directors). But see Ellman, supra note 240, at 1014-15 (observing
that trust fiduciary rules would bar transactions between.charity and its trustees
even if .fair under corporate standard, while donors might prefer such
transactions).
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ported charity.2 55 Because of the severity of revoking a charity's tax
exemption due to prohibited private inurement, especially its im-
pact on innocent beneficiaries, the IRS rarely is willing to revoke
the tax-exempt status of charities. This new "intermediate sanc-
tions" scheme allows the IRS to impose sanctions short of revoking
the organization's tax-exemption.25 6 The tax would be measured
only by the "excess benefit" (rather than by the full amount in-
volved, as for private foundation prohibited transactions), and falls
only on wrongdoing insiders and participating charity managers. 25 7
C. Expanded Standing to Sue and Increased Disclosure
Nonprofit law is designed so that private action against the
nonprofit rarely occurs. A co-trustee or director can usually bring a
derivative suit against wrong-doing trustees or directors.258 Mem-
bers with the power to vote for directors25 9 usually also have stand-
ing to bring derivative suits. 260 Trustees, however, rarely sue each
other, and few nonprofits (other than mutual nonprofits) have vot-
ing members. As a practical matter, only state attorneys general are
likely to bring charities into court.2 6 1
255. I.R.C. § 4958 (1996). Section 4958, Taxes on Excess Benefit Transac-
tions, was enacted by subtit. B, tit. XIII, Taxpayer Bill of Rights II, Pub. L. No. 104-
168, 110 Stat. 1452, on July 30, 1996.
256. I.R.C. § 4958.
257. Id.
258. See Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 28
U.S.F. L. REv. 37, 53-59 (1993) (discussing suits brought by charitable directors or
trustees). See, e.g., Mary v. Lupin Found., 609 So. 2d 184, 191 (La. 1992) (allowing
director to bring derivative suit against co-directors for breach of fiduciary duty).
259. The statutory definition of "member" can differ from the colloquial
term. A nonprofit might offer "memberships" to donors without granting voting
rights; or a nonprofit might offer several membership classes but only one with
voting rights.
260. See id. at 606-15 (discussing standing by donors, members, patrons and
beneficiaries of nonprofit corporations). Consider the case of Fowler v. Bailey, 844
P.2d 141 (Ok. 1992). Members of a church brought suit against the pastor, dea-
cons and trustees in order to examine church records, because they suspected the
pastor of misusing church funds. Id. at 143. In response, the church expelled the
plaintiffs. Id. The court held that excommunication is non-justiciable, and accord-
ingly dismissed the complaint for lack of standing-only "members" can sue a
church under state law, and the plaintiffs were no longer members. Id. at 144.
States often defer more to religious nonprofits than to ordinary nonprofits. See,
e.g., REv. MODEL NONPROFrr CORP. Acr § 114 cmt. (1987).
261. Similarly, taxpayers have no standing to challenge a nonprofit's tax-ex-
empt status. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (requir-
ing plaintiffs to show that revoking tax-exempt status will redress direct personal
injury); In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989)
(holding third parties cannot challenge tax-exempt status of Catholic Church on
grounds of impermissible political activity), cert. denied sub nom. Abortion Rights
Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic Conference, 495 U.S. 918 (1990).
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Both courts and legislators have been loath to permit either
donors or the beneficiary class to direct the expenditure of charita-
ble resources. A donor, even one who imposed conditions on the
gift, makes a completed transfer. For the beneficiaries, ironically,
ordinary trust law grants the greatest rights to the most identifiable
beneficiaries. Thus, the more an entity looks like a real charity,
having an unidentifiable and broad class of beneficiaries, the less
likely that its beneficiaries can sue for relief. Apparently, this is true
even for derivative suits, although it is not always easy to distinguish
between personal and derivative relief in this context.262
Perhaps because a donor's power is strongest before making a
contribution, state oversight concentrates on the aspect of charities
that deals with the public as donors. Most states impose some chari-
table solicitation registration and reporting requirements. 2 63 In the
1960s and 1970s, model statutes swept the states, until twenty-eight
states and countless municipalities adopted ceilings on the percent-
age of annual charity revenues that could be spent on fund-raising
expenses.2 64 States also increased fund-raising disclosure require-
ments.265 In the 1980s, however, a series of Supreme Court deci-
sions blocked reform, on First Amendment free-speech grounds.2 66
Percentage limits on fund-raising disproportionately impact new
charities, which typically have low name recognition and no estab-
lished donor base, as well as charities soliciting for unpopular
causes, which require a greater expenditure to raise a dollar.2 6 7
262. But see Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training Sch. for Deaconesses
and Missionaries, 367 F. Supp. 536, 540 (D.D.C. 1973) (certifying ten thousand
patients of hospital as class to sue derivatively for injunction against director mis-
management and self-dealing, but denying certification for direct suit for treble
damages under antitrust laws).
263. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 400.273 (1996) (licensing charities for
solicitation).
264. BRUCE HOPKINS, CHARITY UNDER SIEGE: GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF
FUND-RAISING 96-97 (1980). See generally Leslie G. Espinoza, Straining the Quality of
Mercy: Abandoning the Quest for Informed Charitable Giving, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 605
(1991) (discussing history and effect of regulating charitable fund-raising).
265. Espinoza, supra note 264, at 621-31.
266. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988)
(holding North Carolina statute requiring professional fund-raisers to obtain
licenses violated First Amendment); Maryland v. Joseph H. Munsun Co., 467 U.S.
947 (1984) (holding Maryland statute prohibiting charitable organizations from
paying fund-raising expenses in excess of 25% violated First Amendment); Village
of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (holding First
Amendment violated where ordinance prohibited charitable organizations from
fund-raising where less than 75% of fund-raising proceeds went for charitable
purposes).
267. To some extent nonprofit rating agencies like the National Charities In-
formation Bureau (NCIB) encourage the public to focus on overhead percentages.
For example, the NCIB imposes minimum standards that require an independent
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States may punish fraudulent fund-raising speech after-the-fact, but
"[s]chemes which attempt to equate fraud with dollar efficiency
have been consistently held to be invalid." 268
Much of the role of forcing charities to disgorge information
has fallen to the IRS. When pressure builds for uniform reporting,
the public looks to Congress, who in turn looks to the IRS.2 69 It was
not until 1942, however, that Congress first required tax-exempt or-
ganizations to file information returns. 270 Congress has moved
slowly in obligating exempt organizations to provide information to
the public. Until legislation was enacted in 1996, a tax-exempt or-
ganization needed only to make its exemption application and an-
nual information returns available for inspection at its office. 271
The new legislation finally requires exempt organizations to
promptly mail a copy of returns on request and to provide them on
the spot to in-person requesters.2 72
Economists Avner Ben-Ner and Theresa Van Hoomissen have
made the most extreme proposal to enhance public access and
standing. They urge that states amend nonprofit law to establish a
board, a clear statement of purpose, detailed budgets and good cost control.
Moreover, the NCIB requires that established charities adhere to a 40% limit on
fund-raising and other administrative costs. See Alison Leigh Cowan, The Gadfly
Who Audits Philanthropy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1990, § 3, at 9 (reporting on private
auditing of nonprofit entities). The author points out that the NCIB determined
that Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) should have allocated 77% of re-
ceipts to fund-raising. MADD had allocated 35%, on the ground that it had in-
cluded information on drunk driving in its fund-raising solicitation. In the NCIB's
view, MADD misclassified these mailing costs as program expenses, rather than as
fund-raising expenses. Id.
268. Errol Copilevitz, There is a Place for the Non-Profit Community in the Regula-
toiy Process, FUND RAISING MGMrT., Oct. 1991, at 64. Copilevitz was lead counsel in
Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
269. Some states that also require a filing accept the IRS return instead. Still,
there are often variations in what the states demand, resulting in multiple filings.
Charities and the public would benefit if these filing requirements were stream-
lined. See, e.g., 10 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 807, 807 (Oct. 1994) (reporting com-
ments by attorney Victoria Bjorkland of New York, that "state regulators have
informally been talking among themselves to see if they could create a single cover
sheet acceptable in every state that would go over the [IRS] Form 990").
270. Howard M. Schoenfeld, Outline, 10 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 821, 821 (Oct.
1994) (outlining talk given to Exempt Org. Comm. of Tax Section of ABA, Annual
Meeting, Aug. 5, 1994).
271. In 1950, the IRS made available for public inspection the returns of cer-
tain charitable organizations and in 1958 made public the applications for recogni-
tion of tax exemption. Id. It was not until 1969 that the public was permitted to
see all other annual information returns. Id. In 1987, Congress required exempt
organizations to make their exemption application and annual information re-
turns available for inspection at their places of business. See I.R.C. § 6104 (1996).
272. I.R.C. § 6104(e) (1996), as amended by Taxpayer Bill of Rights II, Pub. L.
No. 104-168, § 1313(a), 110 Stat. 1452 (1996). The new law takes effect only upon
the issuance of regulations.
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new status called "stakeholder."2 73 Stakeholders would elect the
board of directors, be entitled to financial and programmatic infor-
mation from the organization, and could sue the board "for making
undisclosed programmatic changes." 274 Stakeholders would gener-
ally acquire their interests in proportion to contributions, which
Professors Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen defined as monetary dona-
tions, purchases and volunteer time.2 75 In cases of extremely low
stakeholder participation, they would have a government entity
elect the board.276
V. DEFENSE OF THE LEGAL STATUS Quo
Nonprofit law constitutes only a small portion of the powerful
institutional forces that legitimate, and in many cases dictate and
sanction (in both senses of the word), the behavior of nonprofit
organizations and the people that deal with them. How do we in-
terpret this phenomenon? Perhaps the law goes only as far as it has
to, and until misbehavior occurs, the law does not need tightening.
Alternatively, the situation might indicate institutional lag: that the
law, in its foresighted wisdom, beckons nonprofits to operate most
effectively, while the public needs time to overcome its conditioned
biases against a well-run nonprofit sector.
I propose a third view. The first two views share a Panglossian
assumption of progress, that society evolves in continuous forward
improvement. Clearly, we cannot deny the development of new in-
stitutional forces, the most important being the (at least apparent)
secularization of society.2 77 The history reviewed in Part II, how-
ever, reveals that many of the basic terms of the social debate are
eternal and that institutions dominant at different times and differ-
ent places resolved the debate in different ways.2 78 Many of today's
273. Avner Ben-Ner & Theresa Van Hoomissen, The Governance of Nonprofit
Organizations: Law and Public Policy, 4 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 393, 408-10
(1994).
274. Id. at 410. The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act allows only
members to obtain even the most formal corporate records. REv. MODEL NON-
PROFIT CORP. Acr § 16.02 (1987); see id. § 16.05 cmt. (member-list access rule).
275. Ben-Ner & Van Hoomissen, supra note 273, at 410.
276. Id.
277. See PETER DOBKIN HALL, RELIGION AND THE ORIGIN OF VOLUNTARY AS-
SOCIATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (Yale Univ. Program on Non-Profit Organiza-
tions, Working Paper No. 213, Nov. 1994) (discussing role of religion in American
culture).
278. For a discussion of this eternal debate, see Part II supra notes 10-144 and
accompanying text.
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"hot issues" also concerned Americans living one, two and three
centuries ago:
1. Who bears responsibility for the poor? Are welfare ben-
efits public entitlements or dependent on discretionary
charity? And what about the non-poor who are still
needy? Do we place the burden on the family, or do we
recognize a role for private charity here as well, or even
publicly assure each individual health care, an educa-
tion and a pension?
2. Which sector best provides health care? Schooling?
3. Who should invest in, and profit from, such infrastruc-
ture improvements as bridges, canals, railroads, tol-
lroads, telephone service and utilities?279
4. Where should wealth, and the control of wealth, re-
side? Should families be permitted dynastic control of
their property through foundations? Should states
treat nonprofits as "private," with assets beyond the
reach of the political wishes of current generations?280
Each society must make these decisions anew. In our time, we see
how government privatization of social services raises numerous
political, economic and legal questions.281
My progress-agnostic view also recognizes the limits of the law.
Some scholars complain that, given the absence of shareholders in
the nonprofit sector, the law permits nonprofit assets to escape the
279. Early monastic foundations built bridges, as suggested by the title "pon-
tiff." Douglas, supra note 10, at 43 n.2; see also Ronald L. Coase, The Lighthouse in
Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357, 362-72 (1974) (discussing generally evolution of
British lighthouse system).
280. See Brody, Charitable Endowments, supra note 21.
281. See generally BOZEMAN, supra note 30 (discussing economic effects of regu-
lation on organizations); Danielle Butschi & Sandro Cattacin, The Third Sector in
Switzerland: The Transformation of the Subsidiarity Principle, 16 W. EUR. POL. 362
(1993) (discussing role of nonprofit organizations in construction of modern Swiss
welfare system); Estelle James, Why Do Different Countries Choose a Different Public!
Private Mix of Educational Services?, 28J. HUMAN RESOURCES 571 (1993) (discussing
how government policies influence educational opportunities in public and pri-
vate sectors); Cotton M. Lindsay, A Theory of Government Enterprise, 84J. POL. ECON.
1061 (1976) (comparing management productivity of government enterprises with
productivity of proprietary organizations); B. Peter Pashigian, Consequences and
Causes of Public Ownership of Urban Transit Facilities, 84J. POL. ECON. 1239 (1976)
(discussing modern shift in transit services from private to public); Lester M.
Salamon, The Marketization of Welfare: Changing Nonprofit and For-Profit Roles in the
American Welfare State, 37 Soc. SERv. REv. 16 (1993) (discussing impact on charities
of government cutbacks in social welfare spending); Harold J. Sullivan, Privatiza-
tion of Public Services: A Growing Threat to Constitutional Rights, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
461 (Nov./Dec. 1987) (discussing impact of privatization on constitutional rights).
[Vol. 41: p. 433
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rigors of the market.28 2 Legal forces, however, cannot make non-
profits run in a particular way any more than the law can override
the business judgment of proprietary firms.28 3 Indeed, nonprofits
actually run better, while proprietary enterprises run less efficiently,
than conventionally assumed. 284 This intersectoral blurring results
because all organizations are subject to many of the same economic
forces of resource dependency, organizational isomorphism and
operational slack.
The public often reacts negatively to the operational ways in
which nonprofits have come to resemble for-profits. Such "inap-
propriate" behavior as high salaries, fierce competition and bottom-
line oriented management brings calls for legal reform. Most of
these proposals fail to address the real concerns. Proposals to alter
the cy pres doctrine, which perpetuates the long-dead donor's desig-
nated purpose for a charitable trust, would not in many states reach
nonprofit corporations, which are the dominant form of charity in
this country. Endowing the public with standing rights to bring
nonprofit derivative suits does not disturb the charity manager's
strongest defense, the business judgment rule. States worried about
misleading fundraising by charities can require greater financial
disclosure, but then charities must still educate the public about
their expenditure needs.
Finally, the wrong kind of laws can make things worse. Subsi-
dies induce investment in particular activities and overregulation
discourages investment. Proposals limiting the scope of the non-
profit sector to specified "worthy" enterprises require that we agree
on how the intersectoral debate should be resolved. I assert that no
resolution is possible.285 Often the best law is no law, so that activi-
282. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, The Changing Roles of Public, Private, and Non-
profit Enterprise in Education, Health Care, and Other Human Services, in INDIVIDUAL
AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: CHILD CARE, EDUCATION, MEDICAL CARE, AND LONG-
TERM CARE IN AMERICA 246-51 (Victor Fuchs ed., 1995) (discussing benefits and
detriments of market economies on nonprofit organizations).
283. To the extent the nonprofit sector holds passive assets, such as stocks
and bonds, recent studies show an increase in modern investment strategies by
charitable endowments and foundations. See, e.g., Uniform Mgmt. of Institutional
Funds Act (1972), 7A U.L.A. 705 & 1996 Supp. at 300; WILIAM L. CARY & CRAIG B.
BRIGHT, THE DEVELOPING LAW OF ENDOWMENT FUNDS: "THE LAW AND THE LORE"
REVISITED 7-11, 23-25 (1974); WILLIAM L. CARY & CRAIG B. BRIGHT, THE LAW AND
THE LORE OF ENDOWMENT FUNDS 31-32, 69 (1969); see generally RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS (PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE) (1990).
284. See generally Brody, Agents Without Principals, supra note 3 (comparing how
economic forces affect nonprofit and for-profit firms).
285. A court can only interpret the law-a statute must tell the courts what
answers public policy wants. See, e.g., BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECON-
OMY 7 (1988). Weisbrod observes:
1996]
57
Brody: Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
ties can be conducted by the most efficient and responsive firms,
regardless of organizational form. Once we recognize the irrele-
vance of organizational form-as public agency, business corpora-
tion or nonprofit charity-society can focus on the aspects of firm
activity that it needs to regulate more productively.
In the end, there is no one right way to allocate power and
responsibility among the public and private sectors. But we can ac-
curately frame the political questions, and do the least harm, if we
limit legal solutions to legal problems. Successful reforms are likely
to be narrowly targeted.286 For example, if society does not like
subsidizing certain types of nonprofits, it can remove those subsi-
dies, such as by revoking tax exemption for nonprofit hospitals that
fail to provide free charity care.28 7 As a result of the limits of the
law, nonprofit entities, as well as other organizations, will continue
to be "governed" primarily by other social institutions. Social insti-
tutions can still-if not best-work their will within a laissez-faire
legal framework.
A. Broad Proposals for Reform
1. Restricting the Size of the Nonprofit Sector
Reform proposals are not all alike. It is one thing to decide to
withhold a government subsidy, such as an income tax exemption.
It is quite another to deny a nonprofit charter, as the federal gov-
ernment did to the Rockefeller Foundation. I have no problem
with tailoring subsidies to the conditions that exist from time to
time. Indeed, I believe that subsidies are just one of the fluid char-
Public policy toward nonprofits-to the extent there is one-can be de-
scribed most aptly as confused. Government simultaneously encourages
and discourages nonprofits-subsidizing and restricting them, proclaim-
ing their virtues and distrusting them. This is not surprising, since there
is little consensus as to what goals society should achieve by fostering non-
profits.... And without a consensus there cannot be tests of whether
goals are being reached or even approached.
Id.
286. See also Laura B. Chisolm, Accountability of Nonprofit Organizations and
Those Who Control Them: The Legal Framework, 6 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP
141, 144-45, 149-50 (1995) (reviewing reform available through corporation law,
common law of charitable trusts, state law regulating general welfare and federal
tax exemption law). "Efforts to 'fix' the legal rules to address one kind of per-
ceived accountability problem ought not to be undertaken without careful thought
to the impact of the change on other aspects of accountability." Id. at 150.
287. See Evelyn Brody, Making the Subsidy Fit the Times (Oct. 30, 1996)
[hereinafter Brody, Subsidy] (unpublished manuscript, on file with Villanova Law
Review) (discussing existing tax treatment of charities, effects of fundamental tax
reforms on exempt organizations and merits of converting tax subsidies to direct
expenditures).
[Vol. 41: p. 433
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acteristics of our mixed economy. What if, however, the State of
New York had also refused to give the Rockefeller Foundation a
charter? Why should states want to say to any enterprise, "Thou
shalt be owned?"288
Society's concern over the size of the nonprofit sector has two
independent aspects, one external and one internal. First, there is
the problem of the benefactor who has tied the hands of the charity
but the restriction has outlived its purpose. Second, there is the
problem of the unfettered nonprofit organization whose manage-
ment clings to the traditional use of its assets, free from the rigors
of the marketplace.
Professor Simes called the perpetual charitable trust "a balanc-
ing of two imponderables."28 9 Implicitly, the state determines that
net social welfare increases even by permitting the dead hand of the
testator to govern the enjoyment of his or her wealth into
perpetuity, subject to the cy pres power. Donors, of course, make
trade-offs of their own in choosing between the benefit of devoting
the property to perpetual charitable use versus devising the prop-
erty to family. Donors take into account the likelihood that their
donated property will remain governed by their wishes. Any limita-
tion, whether based on purpose or the passage of time, will reduce
the value of the charitable bequest both absolutely and in relation
to the value of an alternate devise. 290
In the case of the charity that has lost its purpose, if the charity
exists in trust form, the trustees may be as eager as anyone to apply
288. A more modern example of the problem, and one which involves a pub-
lic charity rather than a grant-making foundation, is the (admittedly extreme) case
of Shriner Hospitals for Crippled Children. As of 1987, $2.2 billion of its $2.6
billion in assets were invested in securities, real estate and other passive holdings.
Carl Milofsky & Stephen D. Blades, Issues of Accountability in Health Charities: A Case
Study of Accountability Problems Among Nonprofit Organizations, 20 NONPROFIT & VOL-
UNTARY SECTOR Q. 371 (1991).
289. SIMES, supra note 202, at 181.
290. While the Dartmouth College case involved a charitable corporation
rather than a charitable trust, similar concerns arise. As Justice Marshall wrote:
"[O]ne great inducement to these [charitable] gifts is the conviction felt by the
giver, that the disposition he makes of them is immutable." Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 647 (1819). In his brief for the college, Daniel
Webster warned of the perverse incentives in permitting the legislature to alter the
charter of a charitable corporation:
Benefactors will have no certainty of effecting the object of their bounty;
and learned men will be deterred from devoting themselves to the service
of such institutions, from the precarious title of their offices. Colleges
and halls will be deserted by all better spirits, and become a theatre for
the contention of politics. Party and faction will be cherished in the
places consecrated to piety and learning.
Id. at 599.
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to the courts to have the purposes of the charity reformed. A liber-
alized cy pres doctrine, or even permitting the trustee absolute dis-
cretion consistent with any charitable purpose, could bring much
needed sense to outdated or wasteful trusts. 291 Moreover, a willing
and unconstrained corporate charity can usually alter its activities,
merge with another charity, or sell its assets and distribute the liqui-
dated proceeds to another charity.2 92
For these policy reasons, I am very disturbed by the positions
taken by a few state attorneys general and judges in regard to the
conversion of nonprofit hospitals to for-profit enterprises. A Michi-
gan judge, ruling in favor of the state attorney general, recently
barred ajoint operating arrangement between a nonprofit hospital
and the for-profit Columbia/HCA.2 93 Pending its appeal, the non-
profit is now negotiating for an outright sale of its assets, a course to
which the judge had no legal objection. 294 Worse, some state attor-
neys general and courts favor a tight adherence to the cy pres princi-
ples, that, they maintain, apply to nonprofit hospital
corporations. 295 As a result, for example, the attorney general of
California would like to see the cash proceeds resulting from a sale
of assets be used to benefit other nonprofit hospitals.2 96 This
291. Atkinson, supra note 198, at 1143.
292. For an example of one state that applies a quasi-cy pres doctrine, see supra
note 210 and accompanying text. States also see a legal problem in assuring fair
valuation of sold charitable assets, particularly when the purchasers of the charity's
assets are also the charity's insiders. See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 253, at 142 (analo-
gizing these directors to for-profit directors who evaluate a management buy-out
proposal).
293. Kelly v. Michigan Affiliated Healthcare System, Inc., No. 96-83848-CZ
(Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept. 5, 1996), transcript of oral court ruling, available in LEXIS,
Fedtax Library, TNT file, 96 TNT 187-18 (ruling that nonprofit could sell its assets
but could not commit them to joint venture whose profits would be shared with
for-profit company); see also Kelly v. Michigan Affiliated Healthcare System, Inc.,
complaint (June 17, 1996), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file, 96 TNT
187-16 15 ("This deal will abrogate a heritage of nonprofit, community based
healthcare grounded in principals of charity and benevolence, in exchange for a
delivery system driven by shareholder greed and motivated by profit and return on
investment.").
294. Marlis L. Carson, Exempt Health Care System Negotiating Outright Sale, 73
TAX NOTEs 397, 397 (Oct. 28, 1996).
295. See generally Robert A. Boisture, State Attorneys General's Legal Authority to
Police the Sale of Nonprofit Hospitals and HMOs, 13 EXEMr ORG. TAX REv. 227 (1996)
(discussing powers of state attorneys general in regulating sales of healthcare
organizations).
296. See, e.g., Greg Jaffe & Monica Langley, Fledgling Charities Get Billions from
the Sales of Nonprofit Hospitals, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1996, at Al, A5 (quoting Jim
Schwartz, deputy attorney general of California, "Foundation assets must be used
for real health care-hospitalization, physician care to the sick, particularly indi-
gents .... Wellness and prevention may be worthwhile, but they're not part of the
trust for which the money was originally raised."); Queen of Angels Hosp. v.
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makes no sense where economic efficiency dictated the sale in the
first place. If the hospital subsector is indeed contracting, then the
sale proceeds should be devoted, at best, to other health care pur-
poses, and perhaps even to any charitable purpose. 297
A private nonprofit sector still rests the efficient use of charita-
ble assets with the trustees and directors. The problem of the in-
competent trustee or director still remains. The state cannot
dislodge the lazy or complacent fiduciary as long as the fiduciary
breaches no legal duties owed to the charity. This situation, how-
ever, only appears helpless. Their organizational form does not of
itself cause nonprofits to be managed worse than for-profits. 298
Nonprofits must compete for donations, volunteers, labor and con-
tracts in the same way for-profit entities compete for employees,
supplies and customers, and competition improves operating effi-
ciency. Viewed from the other direction, business enterprises are
not the paragons some make them out to be, suffering as they do
from many of the same inefficiencies found in nonprofit structures.
We should not compare actual nonprofits to a proprietary ideal
that does not exist.
Should the state decide that the charitable exception to the
Dead Hand prohibition leads to unacceptable social waste, it can
alter the law in one of several ways. These options, however, have
uncertain practical results. Extreme proposals would raise serious
"final-period" problems. Both an absolute ban on charitable be-
quests and a 100% estate tax would induce donors to make lifetime
gifts to charity.2 99
Younger, 66 Cal. App. 3d 359, 365 (1977) (requiring sale proceeds to be used to
carry out charity's original purpose: operation of a hospital).
297. See Thomas Silk, Conversions of Tax-Exempt Nonprofit Organizations: Federal
Tax Law and State Charitable Law Issues, 13 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 745, 746 (1996)
(suggesting that "the sector shift is likely to encourage courts to take into account
changed circumstances and thereby modify the original charitable purpose as war-
ranted"). For example, one Tennessee foundation that resulted from the sale of
hospital assets believes that federal and state programs adequately meet the needs
of most uninsured patients; its board determined that education, rather than
health care, was the community's biggest concern. Jaffe & Langley, supra note 296,
at Al, AS.
298. See Brody, Agents Without Principals, supra note 3, at 460 ("Firms in both
[for-profit and not-for-profit] sectors look a great deal alike because both the non-
distribution constraint in the nonprofit sector and the theory of profit-maximiza-
tion in the proprietary sector often fail to deliver on their promises.") (footnote
omitted).
299. Andrew Carnegie, long before he set up his own foundation, praised
confiscatory estate taxes so that "the surplus wealth of the few will become, in the
best sense, the property of the many." HALL, supra note 1, at 158.
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More moderately, if the state were to set a term limit for chari-
ties, what happens to the assets (if any) that remain? Is society bet-
ter served by requiring reversion to the donor's family, to the state
or, indeed, to another charity? Think of the incentives created by
each of these, and how they present an exaggerated example of the
ordinary conflict of interest between the holder of a life estate and
the holder of the remainder interest. If the donor's family enjoys
the reversionary interest and the family controls the fund, the man-
agers will seek to minimize charitable expenditures. By contrast, if
outsiders control, the charity will try to spend the funds before they
revert to the heirs. If the state enjoys the reversionary interest, the
state attorney general might need to constantly bring lawsuits to
ensure the preservation of the assets. If assets instead must go to
another charity, imagine the rules needed to stop reciprocal trans-
fers between charities. For example, the Ford Foundation and the
Rockefeller Foundation could agree to swap their assets every x
years, where x is the maximum statutory life of a charity.300 Perhaps
society wants to-and could-bar such deals, but does it want to-
and could it-bar a charity from distributing its assets to just a few
other charities?3 01
In addition, a charity operating under a term limit will have
difficulty attracting and keeping good management and staff. In
1969, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Edwin S. Cohen, testi-
fied against a Senate proposal to require that a foundation dis-
tribute all of its assets at the end of a specified period of time:
[I]f a foundation were limited to a 20-year life, and you
wanted it run and managed as well as it can be, who will
take on the responsibility of running it in the last 5 or 8
years? There is quite a management problem of getting
people to run them when they have a deadline for the ter-
300. The Senate version of the 1969 Tax Reform Act would have imposed a
40-year time limit on the income-tax exemption of a private foundation. The pro-
posal attacked the churning of assets by a liquidation or merger into another pri-
vate foundation by tacking the transferor's life to the life of the transferee; such a
rule would not apply to a "bona fide charitable grant." See SENATE FINANCE COMM.,
REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 13270, TAx REFORM ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 91-552,
pt. IV, at 25-27 (1969). Policing the distinction would not have been easy. In any
event, the conference agreement deleted the provision.
301. Under the 1969 Senate proposal, the foundation would have been per-
mitted to distribute its assets to a publicly supported charity or, by the end of 40
years, the foundation could have evolved into a publicly supported charity itself
and thus continued its tax exemption. Id. Congress considered no proposals to
impose term limits on publicly supported charities, presumably on the theory that
we worry only about a single family indefinitely managing charitable wealth for
indirect private benefit.
[Vol. 41: p. 433
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mination of their life. And we were concerned with that.
I have had some experience with businesses that have
been ordered either by the management or by Govern-
ment authorities to terminate and go out of existence at
the end of 5 years' time, and the management then all
want to go, and you cannot very well blame them. 0 2
2. Limiting Permitted Purposes
To a large degree, laws governing nonprofit organizations are
nearly as laissez faire as those governing proprietary enterprises.303
Typically, a nonprofit may conduct any legal enterprise as long as it
makes no distributions of profits. To Professor Hansmann, this is
the right answer: Where the nonprofit form is the best way to de-
liver a service, a restrictive approach might "inhibit the develop-
ment of these services, or push them inappropriately into the
proprietary or governmental sectors."30 4
Some states make a legal distinction between mutual nonprof-
its and charitable nonprofits in order to focus state supervision on
charities, leaving the oversight of mutuals to their members.30 5
This dichotomy, however, can be difficult to defend on economic
grounds. While all mutual nonprofits provide collective benefits, so
do many (if not most) charities.306 The benefits of higher educa-
302. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 91st
Cong., pt. 1, at 676-77 (Sept. 4-5, 1969) (statements and recommendations of
Treasury Department).
303. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1416 (1989) (discussing "enabling" structure of corporate law).
304. Hansmann, Reforming Law, supra note 224, at 526.
305. See, e.g., Introduction to REv. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. AcT xxviii (1987)
("As the members form a countervailing force roughly equivalent to shareholders,
there is little need to give the attorney general broad jurisdiction over the activities
of mutual benefit corporations."); see also Moody, supra note 240, at 268 ("[T]he
Act looks at a mutual benefit corporation as the collective pocket of its members
while a public benefit corporation must permanently dedicate its assets to public
uses.").
306. See, e.g., Henderson ex rel. Peck v. Eastern Star Homes of Cal., 112 P.2d
605, 607 (Cal. 1941) (holding bequest may be charitable if benefit has sufficiently
widespread social value; relief of poverty is not required). To modern sensibilities,
notions of altruism yield to notions of mutual advantage. Russell Hardin, Altruism
and Mutual Advantage, 67 Soc. SERV. Riv. 358, 361 (1993). Under this view, even
Scrooge's satisfaction of his urge to help the poor constitutes fair value, whether
for moral or political reasons, in return for his transfer. As economists Mark Pauly
and Michael Redisch observed:
If there are barriers to entry by profit-seeking firms (as there are in
higher education and, to some extent, in the hospital industry as well),
potential consumers may be willing to contribute if that is the only way
that output, which yields them consumers' surplus, can be made avail-
able. It is not surprising that private not-for-profit firms which sell out-
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tion are captured in large part by the students, and the benefits of
hospital procedures are captured in large part by the patients. 30 7
Nevertheless, the law views these organizations as producing public
goods, rather than exclusively private goods, because of the positive
benefits of an educated populace and the availability of hospital-
based treatment.308 But if the law were to reclassify hospitals and
universities as mutual nonprofits, thereby depriving them of the
ability to offer tax deductibility for contributions and other tax ben-
efits, on what basis could the law avoid reclassifying a church as a
mutual nonprofit?30 9
In a rough way, the inability to rigorously distinguish between a
charity and a mutual benefit nonprofit-with greater restrictions
for charities-indirectly supports the current law's expansive ap-
proach to nonprofit eligibility. Tax benefits, as well as conditions
on tax exemption, can and should be decided separately. We leave
it to institutions other than the law to govern people's decision to
withhold support from charities that do no "good," whether to the
poor or to themselves.
put-hospitals, universities, symphony orchestras-tend to provide
output which is used not by the poor, but partly by the contributors
themselves.
Pauly & Redisch, supra note 226, at 98 (footnote omitted).
307. See Evelyn Brody, Paying Back Your Country Through Income-Contingent Stu-
dent Loans, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 449, 451 (1994) (noting college education is
profitable for student and family of student).
308. But see Henry Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 10, at 27. Hansmann observed:
[T]he appendectomy performed in a nonprofit hospital, the child care
provided by a nonprofit day-care center, the education provided by a
nonprofit preparatory school, the nursing care provided by a nonprofit
nursing home, and the entertainment provided by a nonprofit symphony
orchestra are all difficult to characterize as public goods in the usual
sense.
Id. at 29. So on what basis does the law draw the line? After all, a healthy business
in the community also produces positive externalities-jobs, which lead to social
stability and well-being. Nevertheless job-production, in itself, generally does not
merit nonprofit status, much less charity status.
309. Similarly, many a charity can look like a governmental unit if the com-
munity is discrete and homogeneous enough. Is there really much difference be-
tween a private or public hospital, or a private or public high school, in Beverly
Hills? The federal tax system treats assessment for "mutual" public undertakings
the same as charitable contributions by granting an income tax deduction for state
income and property taxes. I.R.C. § 164 (1996).
[Vol. 41: p. 433
64
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol41/iss2/2
NONPROFIT SECTOR
B. A New Federalism?
1. Uniform Law of Charity
The yearning for a uniform or single law of charity, while un-
derstandable, must yield to the facts of life under our federal sys-
tem. While it is true that many charities operate in more than one
state, so do many proprietary businesses. Why is a national law of
charity the right answer if a national business corporation law is
not? In addition, although state laws eventually tend to resemble
each other, states sometimes do compete with each other by provid-
ing more hospitable legal environments for certain activities.310
Nonprofits would not happily give up the ability to shop for a
favorable state of incorporation. 311
Moreover, nonprofits sometimes find themselves subject to
multiple laws because they perform multiple roles. It makes sense
to have one set of rules concerning internal governance and an-
other for entitlements, such as tax exemption. Lawmakers similarly
impose regulations, separate from the corporation code, on busi-
nesses that engage in certain activities.
2. State (or Federal) Charity Board
Closer government supervision would not necessarily alter
nonprofit operations. 312 Certainly the state attorney general can
bring a charity into court. But under what circumstances will a suit
succeed?31 3 Because of judicial deference to business judgments,
310. While the powerful institutional force of isomorphism (conformity) op-
erates on legislation, there is sometimes a "race to the bottom" to attract desired
enterprises. See Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8
CARDozo L. Rxv. 709, 740-52 (1987) (discussing Markov Model and impact on
states competing over varying laws).
311. For example, some states limit the monetary damages recoverable from
directors of nonprofit corporations who breach their duty of care. See Introduction
to REv. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACr xxxv-xxxvi (1987).
312. Enforcement does not necessarily mean prosecution of cases in court.
For example, the assistant attorney general who directs the charity office in Massa-
chusetts "takes a 'public health' stance, which includes prevention, education, and
rehabilitation." Bograd, supra note 244, at 4 (adding that Connecticut assistant
attorney general would like his office to perform similar functions, but lacks suffi-
cient resources).
313. See Karst, supra note 242, at 460 (observing that enforcement of duty of
care has been less strict for charitable trustees than for private trustees in part out
of gratitude for volunteer service); see Francis J. Leazes, Jr., The Federal Courts and
Nonprofit Administration: Is it Purely a Private Affair?, 25 ADMIN. & SociETY 243
(1993) (discussing political science approach to suits against charities by attorneys
general).
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run-of-the-mill poor management of a nonprofit is effectively
unreviewable.3 14
Here at last we get to the real question: What is a charity board
(or "stronger" attorney general or IRS) supposed to do? The direc-
tor who engages in gross negligence or harmful conflicts of interest,
once caught, can generally be dealt with under current law, either
informally or formally.315 But reconsider the examples in Part II.
What, besides the Aramony malfeasance,3 16 is legally wrong in those
cases? Would a charity commission dictate salary levels, lobbying
restrictions, membership requirements, fee structures and limits on
activities? Would a charity commission keep proprietary businesses
out of "traditionally" nonprofit fields, and keep charities out of "tra-
ditionally" proprietary fields? Would a charity commission ban
nonprofits from competing with each other, or parcel out geo-
graphic or market turf-and donor bases? The political considera-
tions involved in such questions boggle the mind. 317
314. See, e.g., Miller v. Bargaheiser, 591 N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (Ohio Ct. App.
1990) (noting board of trustees given broad discretion in management of charity).
As Professor Hone commented on the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act:
It is my impression, from talking with state Attorney Generals [sic], that it
is almost impossible to win cases involving only inattentive management
.... Therefore, the Act has adopted a duty of care which imposes liability
only in particularly egregious cases. If one could show years of inatten-
tion, then there would be liability. But if one had just a single lapse, a
terrible judgment, the business judgment rule would protect directors
.... The trust standard would hold directors personally liable for mere
negligence .... It was the subcommittee's opinion that if that were the
standard... very few sensible people would serve on the boards of non-
profit organizations.
Hone, supra note 223, at 772.
315. See, e.g., Boston U. Agrees to New Policies on Top Officers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
1993, § 1, at 31 (reporting Massachusetts Attorney General's Office negotiated
changes in how Boston University defines conflicts of interest, chooses trustees and
pays top officers); Randy Kennedy, New Board Puts Garden Back on Feet, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 1993, § 13, at 9 (noting Botanical Garden Society's 268 members elected
new board members, thereby returning control of garden to society); Steven Lee
Myers, New York to Remove Directors of Garden, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1992, at A23 (stat-
ing New York Attorney General's Office found that actions of Queens Botanical
Garden Society board wasted charitable assets; New York City revoked Garden So-
ciety's license and removed directors).
316. For a discussion of the Aramony/United Way scandal, see supra notes
107-121 and accompanying text.
317. See, e.g., A Chronology of the Methodist Charity-Care Battle in Texas, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, June 7, 1993, at 3. In 1990, the State of Texas sued a hospital to
require increased charity care. Id. In 1992, the hospital's chief executive officer
said in deposition, "In my view, it is a charitable purpose to provide care to a rich
man or a poor man." Id. In 1993, a district court judge dismissed the case on the
ground that the state has no power to dictate how charities allocate their re-
sources. Id. Five months later, the state passed legislation requiring nonprofit hos-
pitals to provide charity care as a condition of their property tax exemptions. Id.
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One proposal advocating a national charity commission implic-
itly recognizes these practical limitations:
The primary focus of the proposed commission would be
on the organization, the functioning, and the results of
private philanthropy, as well as the relationships between
donors and donees. It would have no enforcement pow-
ers (except to require submission of reports), but would
achieve its objectives through studies, dialogue, and dis-
semination of its findings and recommendations. It would
engage in a continuous process of interpreting the philan-
thropic sector to the general public and interpreting
changing public attitudes to the private sector.31 8
The regulators' lack of enforcement zeal reveals more than a
lack of resources. The hard reality is that governments do not want
to take over the business of running charities. The directors of
three of the better-staffed state charity offices (in New York, Con-
necticut and Massachusetts)3 19 said in interviews that they:
share a conviction that their role in relation to troubled
nonprofits should be limited. For varying reasons, they
believe that they should not try to expand their role in
monitoring nonprofit organizations; they should not at-
tempt to provide early-warning systems for groups in
trouble; they should not counsel failing groups to con-
sider closing down. They think that they should not get
involved when a group is having financial troubles, unless
illegal conduct is alleged, nor should they intervene in the
internal battles of a group with active participants. They
think that nonprofit groups should not be required to ask
their permission before obtaining mortgages or taking
other financial risks. They should not "micromanage" a
group nor substitute their own judgment for that of the
board and staff.320
In short, these assistant attorneys general "do not view themselves as
the 'ultimate owners' of the underlying assets of all charitable orga-
318. Yarmolinsky & Fremont-Smith, supra note 247, at 2858.
319. Everything is relative. It appears that over half the states have only one
part-time attorney or no attorney assigned exclusively to charity cases; perhaps ten
states have five or more attorneys on these cases. Connecticut has four (and a case
load of 625 annual reports per attorney), Massachusetts has seven (1,498 reports
each) and New York has seventeen (1,588 reports each). Bograd, supra note 244,
at 5-6, 8-11.
320. Id. at 5-6 (footnote omitted).
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nizations, though they do represent the public, donors, and benefi-
ciaries in certain legal proceedings."3 2 1
3. Conforming Fiduciary Standards
Professor Hansmann asserts that his liberal view towards non-
profit permitted purposes "makes it all the more important that ap-
propriate measures are taken to assure that all nonprofits adhere to
their fiduciary duties."32 2 To this end, he would apply to any entity
choosing nonprofit corporate status the same fiduciary rules that
apply to charitable trusts.3 23
Elsewhere, however, Professor Hansmann recognizes that "eth-
ical constraints may be far more important than legal sanctions in
causing the managers of nonprofits to adhere to their fiduciary re-
sponsibilities."3 24 More important, his proposed ban on dealings
between charities and their substantial contributors and fiduciaries
could gut much of the sector. Self-dealing transactions frequently
arise in the charitable sector. Indeed, people often make desirable
directors because of their ties to certain businesses and their ability
to obtain certain goods or services for the nonprofit on terms
favorable to the nonprofit.3 25 Barring such insider transactions
would cost the nonprofit sector dearly.
Recognizing this dilemma, recent federal legislation will tax
only the "excess benefits" obtained by the insider in self-dealing
transactions.3 26 While the charitable sector supports the goals of
321. Id. at 6; see also Fishman, supra note 18, at 671 ("Today, we live in an age
of deregulation. There are few who believe that another agency with additional
resources is a sufficient cure for any social ill.").
322. Hansmann, Reforming Law, supra note 224, at 527.
323. Under Professor Hansmann's proposal, mutual nonprofits, which com-
monly further the financial interests of their members, would come under the law
that applies to cooperatives. Id. at 588-96.
324. Hansmann, Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 249, at 875-76.
Hansmann finds that these ethical norms operate at different levels, more strongly
in older industries such as hospitals and schools (particularly those affiliated with
religious groups) and in large organizations (where more employees can monitor
the managers, and bureaucratization restricts discretion) and less strongly in
newer sectors and in mixed sectors such as the nursing home industry (where "the
standards of service and conduct set by the proprietary firms eventually may be
taken as an acceptable minimum even among the nonprofits"). Id. at 876.
325. See, e.g., REv. MODEL NONPROFrr CoiPt. AcT § 8.31 cmt. 1 (1987) ("The
Model Act recognizes that many individuals are elected to nonprofit boards be-
cause of their ability to enter into or cause an affiliate to enter into a transaction
with and for the benefit of the corporation."). But see DeMott, supra note 253, at
140 (observing "the prospect of self-dealing may entice some directors to serve"
and indeed to believe themselves to have "a reciprocal entitlement to self-deal").
326. For a further discussion of the Internal Revenue Code provision on ex-
cess benefit transactions, see supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text.
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such a rule, many still worry that determining the presence of ex-
cess benefits will require excessive interference with charitable ac-
tivities and chill desperately needed economic arrangements with
insiders.3 27
C. Expanded Standing to Sue and Increased Disclosure
The IRS information return required of tax-exempt organiza-
tions covers many pages and requests a great deal of information.3 28
Charities must report, among other things, their primary activities,
their sources of funding, the salaries earned by managers, and any
relationships they have with other nonprofit and proprietary orga-
nizations.3 29 The wealth of data demanded by the IRS inspired the
following exchange between a member of the American Bar Associ-
ation and the IRS's special assistant for exempt organization
matters:
Mr. Gallagher Howard, what does the IRS do with all
this stuff?
Mr. Schoenfeld: It's not so much what the IRS does with
all this stuff. It's also what the public
does with all this stuff. That's an equal
part, I think, of what the question
should be.330
But what, then, is the public to do with all this stuff? Access to
information should help the public determine which charities are
worthy of their future support. However, should the public-either
as donors or as beneficiaries-be offered expanded standing rights
to sue charities based on this (and other) information?3 31
327. Cf Fishman, supra note 18, at 668 (suggesting that separate "close non-
profit corporation" scheme could permit a more relaxed mechanism for transac-
tions with insiders of small organizations).
328. See IRS Form 990 (information return of organization exempt from tax).
Small charities can file abbreviated Form 990EZ. Private foundations must file
Form 990-PF. Churches and very small charities are exempt from filing.
329. Id.
330. Edited Transcript of the Morning Sessions of the August ABA EO Committee
Meeting in New Orleans, Panel III, The Role of the IRS in Promoting Public Accountability
of Exempt Organizations, 10 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 805 (Oct. 1994).
331. See Pamela A. Mann & David G. Samuels, Standing to Pursue Claims
Involving Charitable Organizations, N.Y. LJ., July 30, 1993, Outside Counsel sec., at 1
(Ms. Mann was then Assistant Attorney General of New York, in charge of Charities
Bureau, and Mr. Samuels was then her deputy). See generally Blasko et al., supra
note 258 (discussing private parties' rights to pursue litigation against charitable
organizations).
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The law quite clearly has determined that "despite the fact that
the organization is legally bound by specific terms of the gift, legally
it is not the donor's concern. It is society's concern, to be pursued
(or not) by society's representative, the attorney general."332
Similarly, a "central premise of the traditional legal framework...
is that the direct beneficiaries of a charity's activities are but the
vehicle by which the charity delivers a social good to society at large,
and it falls to the representative of society at large (the attorney
general) to call charities to account for their failures. 33 3 Already,
information from dissatisfied insiders constitutes a key resource for
state attorneys general. Even setting aside the question of
reimbursement for costs, 3 3 4 if private parties can prosecute suits,
what makes us think they would have a better chance of success?
Mandatory stakeholder oversight is not a solution.
Institutional beliefs frequently clash with economic needs. Today's
charity faces competition from a myriad of other charities, as well as
high fundraising and administrative costs. At the same time, the
public seems jaded with social problems, and uninterested in
supporting monolithic organizations as opposed to causes. The
public appears uneducated about the fiscal needs of charities, as
many people express surprise that nonprofit managers are paid at
all and reveal ignorance of charities' productive demands. 335 The
public seems less inclined, not more, to become involved in
collective activity. 336 A public that does not understand cost
constraints cannot perform effective oversight.3 37 A public whose
oversight focuses on the wrong considerations induces charities to
adopt inefficient and ineffective behaviors.
If charities want to alter the public's resistance to certain
activities, the charities have educational work to do. The law does
332. Chisolm, supra note 286, at 149.
333. Id.
334. See Fishman, supra note 18, at 674 (proposing that fund, under
supervision of attorney general, could be established for benefit of successful
public-spirited citizens or public interest law firms).
335. Rayna Skolnik, Rebuilding Trust: Nonprofits Act to Boost Reputations, PUB.
REL. J., Sept. 1993, at 30 (quoting American Cancer Society public relations
director: "This is not an amateur undertaking. We try to tell people about the
kind of professionalism that's needed.").
336. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capita 6J.
DEMOCRACY 65, 65 (Jan. 1995) ("There is striking evidence, however, that the
vibrancy of American civil society has notably declined over the past several
decades.").
337. See, e.g., Skolnik, supra note 335, at 29 ("Even the Girl Scouts of the USA
have recently come under fire for using too large a share of cookie-sale profits for
administration, rather than rebating them to the troops that made the sales.").
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not stand in the way. That is, the law does not prevent charities from
making disclosures that are in their interests to make. Charities
should voluntarily be providing at least the information demanded
by the IRS and state regulators.83 8 Nonprofit scholar Virginia
Hodgkinson and her colleagues observe in their most recent
version of the Nonprofit Almanac "As organizations compete for
private contributions and government funds, accountability and
performance will become increasingly more important.
Organizations will have to demonstrate the efficient use of funds
and positive outcomes will be required to produce quantifiable
measures of program achievement and effectiveness to donors,
foundations and government funding agencies."3 39 With the
growing acceptance of the Internet, we are beginning to see an
explosion of Websites created by charities, charity monitors and
governments, all presenting information on the sector. 340
The voluntary disclosure of information also serves charities
that do not solicit contributions. In cases where a charity does not
depend on donations for its operations, state governments worry
less about false solicitations, but the public's concern over
unaccountable and inefficient use of resources intensifies. Even a
charity totally self-sufficient on income from the performance of
services and endowment cannot necessarily keep its activities to
itself. The nonprofit sector continues to need institutional
legitimacy. An informed public is, hopefully, a sympathetic public.
All nonprofits remain politically vulnerable-not just to the
removal of subsidies, but also to the danger of unwise legislation.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are limits on what laws can accomplish. Formal laws are
just one of a myriad of social institutions that govern all aspects of
human interaction. Indeed, asking too much of the law by codify-
ing too many rules interferes with the ability of society to alter the
338. Presently, charities provide information to third-party rating bureaus,
such as the Better Business Bureau, in order to attract donations. See Peter G.
Meek, Self-Regulation in Private Philanthropy, in 5 FILER COMM'N RES. PAPERS, supra
note 41, at 2781. For a further discussion of rating bureaus, see supra note 267 and
accompanying text.
339. HODGKINSON ET AL., supra note 159, at 17.
340. See, e.g., Internet Nonprofit Ctr. (visited Nov. 15, 1996) <http://
www.nonprofits.org.>; State of Maryland's charity Website (visited Nov. 15, 1996)
<http://www.gov.state.md.us/sos/charity/html>; Website of Charity
Accountability Discussion Group, called "Cyber-Accountability" (visited Nov. 15,
1996) <http://www.bway.net/-hbograd/cyb-acc.html>.
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constant trade-offs and accommodations made between complex
and often conflicting institutional demands.
The many ways in which modem nonprofit organizations
struggle to survive has captured headlines. As nonprofits become
more businesslike and competitive, however, they necessarily chal-
lenge current institutionalized beliefs of what nonprofits "should"
and "should not" do. Nonprofits also generate increased calls for
reforming the law in order to keep them in their place-or at least
in a place we nostalgically like to believe once existed in a golden
age.
As this Article describes, however, throughout American his-
tory, nonprofits have never had a defined place.3'4 Rather, in dif-
ferent times and in different places society has variously called on
all types of organizations-public, proprietary or nonprofit-to
conduct collective activity. The resolution of this eternal debate is a
political issue, best decided under a laissez-faire nonprofit law. Ac-
cordingly, I do not believe that significant legal reform of nonprofit
law is called for.
But regulating nonprofits is a separate question from subsidizing
nonprofits. As I will explore in a future article, the recent sea
changes in the nonprofit sector illustrated in this Article require
society to rethink current subsidies.3 42 Subsidies mean more than
tax exemption. They range in form from favorable government
contracts and support, to liberal fiduciary liability laws, to exemp-
tion from constitutional due process and equal protection require-
ments. Monetary subsidies could be replaced with targeted
"output" subsidies of worthy activities-whether conducted by non-
profit or proprietary enterprises-to better allocate our scarce col-
lective resources.
341. For a discussion of the variety of nonprofit activity through history, see
Part II, supra notes 10-144 and accompanying text.
342. See generally Brody, Subsidy, supra note 287 (examining how evolving
functions of nonprofits requires new structure for subsidies).
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